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Only a few countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin America can supply
suitable data for estimating mortality levels in 1900. Many more can
supply such data for 1940 or 1950. Without exception, the estimated
levels of mortality prevailing in those years are higher than current
levels. For those countries that can provide data at both earlier points,
most improvement as indexed by life expectancy at birth has been
achieved since 1940. It appears from fragmentary records that life ex-
pectancy at birth during 1935-39 was about 30 years in Africa and
Asia and 40 years in Latin America. The respective levels in 1965-70
were on the order of 43, 50, and 60 (World Health Organization 1974b;
United Nations, Population Division 1973).
The magnitude and the demographic character of this improvement
have been documented in a number of excellent reviews, and for this
reason they need not detain us here (United Nations 1963, 1973, 1974;
Stolnitz 1974; Arriaga 1970; World Health Organization 1974b). These
works suggest that the mortality improvements, when measured by the
absolute decline in age-specific death rates, have tended to be largest at
ages under 5 (especially infancy) and above 40. The proportionate
declines, on the other hand, have been largest in the older childhood
ages. Life expectancy gains for females have been larger than those for
males. It is likely that gains have been more rapid in urban than in rural
areas. In these matters, mortality experience in less developed countries
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(LDCs) has roughly recapitulated that in more developed countries
(MDCs). Life expectancy differences between MDCs and LDCs have
narrowed, although the lagging pace of improvement in Africa has pro-
duced greater dispersion within LDCs themselves. The decadal rate of
mortality decline in many LDCs surpasses that ever observed in popu-
lations of the now-developed world.
This paper has two purposes: to identify the factors responsible for
these mortality improvements in LDCs and provide estimates of their
relative importance; and to begin tracing the effect of these improve-
ments on demographic and economic processes. Less developed coun-
tries are defined regionally to comprise Africa, Latin America, and Asia
except Japan. Data on mainland China, North Korea, and what was
formerly North Vietnam are not available, and for all practical purposes
these countries are also excluded from the set under review. Conclusions
reached about the importance of various factors in the mortality decline
do not appear to conflict with the impressions of informed observers of
these matters in China (Wegman, Lin, and Purcell 1973).
5.1 Causes of Declining Mortality
There is much more consensus on the fact of mortality decline in
LDCs than on its causes. Considerable dispute remains about whether
the decline has been principally a by-product of social and economic
development as reflected in private standards of nutrition, housing, cloth-
ing, transportation, water supply, medical care, and so on or whether it
was primarily produced by social policy measures with an unprecedented
scope or efficacy. A third possibility is that technical changes reduced
the relative costs of good health. This possibility is usually subsumed
within the social policy position because it is clear to most observers
that the major technical changes that have occurred-immunization
against a host of infectious diseases, vector eradication, chemotherapy
-had to be embodied in social programs in order to affect the mortality
of the masses in LDCs. Demographers have almost unanimously favored
the social policy-technical change interpretation of mortality decline
(Davis 1956; Coale and Hoover 1958; United Nations, Population Divi-
sion 1974; Stolnitz 1974). As evidence, they have principally cited the
unprecedented rate of mortality reduction in many LDCs and certain
dramatic examples of obviously effective government intervention, most
notably in Sri Lanka and Mauritius. Many specialists in international
health (Fredericksen 1961, 1966a,b; Marshall, Brown, and Goodrich
1971), medical historians focusing on primarily Western populations
(McKeown and Record 1962; McKeown 1965), and some economists
(Sharpston 1976) have opposed this interpretation, usually claiming291 Mortality Declines in Less Developed Countries
that social interventions have been largely ineffective or insufficiently
widespread.
Kuznets (1975) and Coale and Hoover (1958) have argued that,
in one sense, the distinction between economic development and pub-
lic health interventions creates a false dichotomy. Development itself
strengthens the nation-state, improves communications among nations
and hence facilitates the transfer of medical technology, and routinizes
scientific advance. While this position is unassailable, it leaves unan-
swered the question whether the mortality decline was a product of
changes in private consumption or of public programs and technical
change, regardless of whether the latter were in turn produced by eco-
nomic development in its broadest sense. Even if public programs and
technical changes were merely intervening variables in the relation be-
tween mortality and development, the importance of their role remains
to be identified.
5.1.1 Effect of Private Income Levels on Mortality
That mortality rates are sensitive to private living standards, inde-
pendent of the national level of economic development, scarcely needs
documentation. Studies of mortality differentials among individuals by
social or economic class in countries as disparate as India and the
United States consistently reveal lower mortality rates among the upper
classes (Kitagawa and Hauser 1973; Vaidyanathan 1972). The role of
private living standards in creating the pattern of international mortality
differentials is more difficult to assess. Richer countries not only have
richer people but, in general, have larger and more effective social pro-
grams.
Some indication of the importance of private living standards for
international mortality differences may be gained by examining the im-
portance of income distribution as a factor in those differences. The
international relation between national income per capita and life expec-
tancy is decidedly nonlinear, with life expectancy showing strongly di-
minishing returns to increases in income (Preston 1975a; ValIin 1968).
It is reasonable to expect that mortality also responds nonlinearly to
individual income levels, in which case the distribution of income within
a nation should influence its aggregate level of mortality. In particular,
suppose that the relation between individual income and life expectancy
is log linear: 1
eOOi = a + b InYi,
where eOOi = life expectancy at birth in income group i
Y i = level of income received by group i
a, b = constants.292 Samuel H. Preston
If the national level of life expectancy is simply the aggregate of these
individual-level relations, with no contribution from the national level
of income except insofar as it reflects individual incomes, then the life
expectancy for the population, eOop, will be equal to
eOop = f[~ (a+ b InYi )]
=a+ b InY+ b X tXt In (Si/f),
where Y = mean level of income in the population
Si= share of total national income earned by group i
f = share of total population represented by group i,
assumed to be constant among the groups.
Life expectancy will be a function of mean national income, Y, and of
the distribution of income as represented by the term ~ In(S'/f). This
term, which is related to the entropy measure of income distribution,
ranges from 0 if income is perfectly evenly distributed to (-00) if one
group has no income. Strictly speaking, the weights that permit subgroup
life expectancies to aggregate into population life expectancy are pro-
vided by births rather than by population size, but the two will be very
highly correlated.
To examine the importance of private incomes for national life expec-
tancy, the value of this income distribution measure was computed for
fifty-two populations on which income shares were estimated in 5%
population segments. The values and sources can be found in appendix
table 5.A.2, along with values of eOo and Y. The importance of private
incomes can be inferred from the consistency of coefficients on Y and
on the income distribution measure. If national life expectancy is simply
a function of private income levels, the coefficients on ~ In(SJ05)
should be 0.05 of the coefficient on Y. If national income contributes
independently of private income, the ratio should be less than 0.05. The
equation as estimated by ordinary least squares on the fifty-two obser-
vations is
eOo = 19.105 + 6.984 InY+ .375 ~ 1 (S/05)
(.859) (.237) i n i .
R2 = .651
R2 = .644.
The coefficient of the income distribution term is in fact 0.0536 of that
of national income, suggesting that relations between mortality and in-
come at the national level are indeed dominated by relations between
mortality and income at the individual level. This result should be
treated with great caution because of inaccuracy and incomparability293 Mortality Declines in Less Developed Countries
in the measure of income distribution and because the log-linear func-
tional form probably simplifies a more complex relationship. Further-
more, the standard error of the income distributional coefficient is large
enough to prevent rejection of the hypothesis that the true coefficient is
zero. Nevertheless, one direct implication of the result is that the mor-
tality risks facing a family earning $10,000 per year or $100 per year
are not strongly influenced by the prevailing level of average income in
the nation in which they reside.
The suggestion that private incomes are very influential in determin-
ing national levels of life expectancy at a moment in time does not
imply, of course, that changes in private incomes have been the dominant
factor in mortality changes during this century. The actual changes in
income may have been too small, in conjunction with the sensitivity of
mortality to income, to account for the observed mortality changes.
Before trying to establish the role played by changes in private living
standards in LDC mortality declines, it is useful to make an assessment
of the causes of death responsible for those declines.
5.1.2 Causes of Death Responsible for Mortality Declines
Interpretation of mortality declines in LDCs would depend on whether
the cause of death responsible for the majority of declines were, for
example, smallpox, diarrheal disease, or malaria, since it is clear that
death rates from these causes are fundamentally responsive to different
influences. Unfortunately, the causes of death responsible for mortality
change in LDCs have never been documented on a broad scale. A large
part of the reason is that most LDCs still cannot supply national-level
data on cause patterns, and data for those that can undoubtedly reflect
inaccurate diagnoses and incomplete coverage. Problems are magnified
when attention is turned to the patterns of earlier years. Nevertheless,
it is possible to piece together a picture that provides some useful clues
about the order of magnitude of the causes responsible.
First, it is clear that, in high-mortality populations, infectious and
parasitic diseases bear almost exclusive responsibility for shortening life
below the modern Western standards of 69 years for a male and 75 for
a female. Life tables by cause of death have been constructed for 165
populations at varying levels of mortality (Preston, Keyfitz, and Schoen
1972). When the aggregate of infectious and parasitic diseases were
hypothetically eliminated from those life tables and life expectancy was
recalculated, the common result was to produce a life expectancy be-
tween 65 and 70 for males and between 70 and 75 for females, regard-
less of a population's initial mortality level (Preston, Keyfitz, and
Schoen 1973). In 1920, Chilean males would hypothetically have gone
from a life expectancy of 28.47 to one of 65.68 and females from 29.85
to 69.76. In Taiwan, males would have enjoyed a life expectancy of294 Samuel H. Preston
72.27 years instead of 26.68, and females 76.00 instead of 29.18 (Pres-
ton, Keyfitz, and Schoen 1972, pp. 150-51, 702-3).2
Despite the appeal of life table measures, they are an unnecessarily
awkward vehicle for discussing causes of death because the causes are
nonadditive in their effect on life table parameters. This problem is
averted by the use of age-standardized death rates. Models have been
constructed to represent the typical cause-of-death structure for popula-
tions at various levels of mortality as indexed by the age-standardized
crude death rate from all causes combined (Preston and Nelson 1974).
Of the 165 populations supplying data for these models, only 41 were
from Africa, Asia, or Latin America, and of these 5 were for Japan and
3 for the Jewish population of Israel. Nevertheless, the results suggest
that cause-of-death structures, controlling mortality level, vary less be-
tween MDCs and LDCs than they do among regional groups within
MDCs. Lower cardiovascular mortality and higher mortality from diar-
rheal diseases and maternal causes in LDCs represent their only signifi-
cant divergence from MDC patterns (Preston and Nelson 1974, p. 37).
John Gordon, one of the leading epidemiologists whose work focuses
on developing countries, states that "infectious disease in the tropics and
in some other preindustrial areas is too often viewed elsewhere as a
collection of odd processes peculiar to those regions. Such diseases as
schistosomiasis, filariasis, paragonimiasis, and all the others do exist.
The plight of children, however, [who account for the bulk of annual
deaths in LDCs] is the result of the everyday infections of the intestinal
and respiratory tracts and with the communicable diseases specific to
early life everywhere" (Gordon 1969, p. 218). Even among adults, the
exotic tropical diseases are typically much more important sources of
morbidity than of mortality.
Thus, there is some justification for allowing LDC cause-of-death
patterns to be represented by relationships calculated on the basis of a
data set that includes both MDCs and LDCs. The typical cause struc-
tures pertaining to populations with age-standardized crude death rates
of 0.035 and 0.020 are presented in table 5.1.3 These are roughly the
levels that probably best characterize the average mortality situation in
LDCs in 1900 and 1970, since they correspond to life expectancies
at birth of 27.5 and 50. 4
What is perhaps surprising about the table is that the specific "name"
infectious and parasitic diseases (the first two listed) account for only
an estimated 26.1% of mortality change. More important than all of
these diseases combined-tuberculosis, typhoid, typhus, cholera, mea-
sles, diphtheria, whooping cough, malaria-is the category of respiratory
diseases, which comprises a wide assortment of respiratory difficulties
that are concentrated largely in infancy and old age. To be sure, some
of the deaths in this category are improperly assigned complications of295 Mortality Declines in Less Developed Countries
Table 5.1 "Normal" Cause-of-Death Patterns at Standardized Crude Death
Rates of 35/1,000 and 20/1,000 and Cause-Patterns of Change
Model Value (Mean, Male and
Female) of Age-Standardized
Crude Death Rate from Cause
at Age-Standardized Crude
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Source: Preston and Nelson (1974).
specific infectious diseases. After undergoing a careful review of the
initial medical certification in 1962-64, death certificates assigned to
influenza/pneumonia/bronchitis in ten cities in Latin America, San
Francisco, and Bristol, England, suffered a net loss of 1.0% of the
original deaths assigned at ages 15-74, while the total of specific infec-
tious and parasitic diseases increased by 5% (Puffer and Griffith 1967,
pp. 230, 235). In a similar study of deaths before age 5 in thirteen
Latin American and two North American areas between 1968 and 1972,
respiratory diseases forfeited 22% of their originally assigned deaths,
while the specific infectious diseases gained 23% (Puffer and Serrano
1973, pp. 332, 342). Corresponding adjustment of figures in table 5.1
would equalize the contribution of the specific infectious diseases and of
the respiratory diseases to mortality decline at about 28-30%. Never-
theless, the "name" infectious diseases remain relatively submerged
compared with popular accounts of their role, a point also stressed by
McDermott (1966). Part of the reason for overemphasis on the role
of the "name" diseases in mortality decline is probably their preeminent
importance in the relatively small-scale English decline from 1851 to
1901, as has been elegantly documented in a widely cited paper by
McKeown and Record (1962).
Some indication of whether the patterns depicted in table 5.1 provide
a suitable representation for LDCs can be gained by examining the few
LDC records that are available. In so doing, it is useful to provide more296 Samuel H. Preston
detail on specific members of the infectious and parasitic set. Mortality
changes during long periods will be considered in order to avoid sam-
pling periods during which specific public health interventions may have
badly distorted the cause pattern of change.
Table 5.2 presents crude death rates from certain diseases of infec-
tious origin for five populations of LDCs in the early twentieth century
and for a more recent year. By and large, they support the previous
estimate of the relative importance of respiratory tuberculosis and diar-
rheal diseases. Influenza/pneumonia/bronchitis is somewhat less impor-
tant a source of decline than depicted in table 5.1, but the reason is
probably that by the latter date each of the four populations supplying
information on this cause achieved a mortality level far superior to the
20/1,000 age-standardized rate assumed in table 5.1. This cause is gen-
erally a more important source of mortality decline in movements be-
tween high and intermediate levels than between intermediate and low
ones (Preston and Nelson 1974, pp. 31-33). As a very shaky generaliza-
tion based on these undoubtedly unrepresentative populations, it may not
be too far off the mark to assign 2% of the twentieth-century mortality
decline in LDCs as a whole to smallpox, 2% to whooping cough, and
1% each to typhoid, typhus, measles, cholera, and plague (the latter
estimate accounting for the disease's heavy concentration in India), and
0.5% to diphtheria. The epidemic nature of typhoid, cholera, and
plague add even more uncertainty to these figures.
But the major uncertainty relates to the role of malaria. If estimates
for British Guiana and India are to be believed, malaria by itself has
accounted for 18-35% of large-scale mortality declines, equaling or
exceeding the contribution we have estimated for all infectious and para-
sitic diseases combined. It should be noted that both estimates are based
upon assignment to malaria of an arbitrary portion of deaths originally
ascribed to "fever." A less arbitrary approach was pursued by Newman
(1965, 1970), who had access to regional mortality data before and
after an eradication campaign in Sri Lanka, as well as to regional data
on malarial endemicity. Newman estimates by indirect techniques that
the malaria eradication campaign in 1946 reduced Sri Lanka's crude
death rate (CDR) by 4.2/1,000 between 1936-45 and 1946-60 (1970,
p. 157). The relative contribution of such a decline to the total mortal-
ity reduction depends, of course, on the size of the latter. Had it been
experienced by one of the populations in table 5.2, where the average
drop in CDR was 26/I,000, it would account for about 16% of the
mortality reduction. As a component of the smaller decline during the
shorter period considered by Newman in Sri Lanka, it represented 42%.
Simple inspection of time-series data on crude death rates suggests that
virtually complete malaria eradication reduced the crude death rate by297 Mortality Declines in Less Developed Countries
Table 5.2 Crude Death Rates (per 1,000) by Cause in Certain LDCs in
the Early Part of the Century and Recently
Chile, Chile, % of Taiwan, Taiwan, % of
Cause of Death 1920- 1971b Decline 1920c 1966d Decline
Typhoid .665 .007 2.9 .045 0 .2
Typhus .439 0 2.0 n.a.
Malaria .026 0 0 2.123 0 7.7
Smallpox .008 0 0 .065 0 .3
Measles .697 .061 2.8 .358 .039 1.2
Whooping cough .789 .006 3.5 .046 .004 .2
Diphtheria .062 .006 .2 .013 .004 0
Influenza/pneumonia/
bronchitis 4.527 1.355 14.1 8.231 .613 27.8
Respiratory tuberculosis 2.404 .209 9.8 1.813 .333 5.4
Diarrhea, dysentery,
cholera nostras 2.120 .397 7.7 1.691 .215 5.4
Cholera n.a. .452 0 1.6
Total 30.85 8.389 32.686 5.246
-Chile, Oficina Central de Estadistica, Annuario Estadistico, vol. 1 (1920).
bWorld Health Organization, World Health Statistics Annual, vol. 1 (1972).
cTaiwan, Jinki Dotai Tokei, Sotoku Kanbo Chosaka (1920).
dUnited Nations, Demographic Yearbook (1967), table 24.
epani (1917, pp. 192-99).
fMandle (1970, p. 303).
I:United Nations, Demographic Yearbook (1973), table 33.
"Compiled from material in Davis (195I, pp. 33-53). Tne 8.7 malaria estimate
assumes that one-third of fever deaths are due to malaria. All estimates are highly
suspect because of very deficient coding. Data on cholera, plague, and smallpox
are probably most accurate because they were most consistently "notifiable" causes
of death at the provincial level. Coale and Hoover (1958, p. 67), using a com-
pletely different technique, estimate the pre-spraying program level of malaria
death rates in India to be about 6/1,000, including deaths indirectly attributable
to the disease.
iCrude death rate from United Nations, Population Division, Selected World Dem-
ographic Indicators by Countries, 1950-2000 (1975), p. 125. Average, 1960 and
1965. Distribution of deaths by cause from United Nations, Demographic Year-
book (1967), table 24. Data are for medically certified deaths in Poona and Bom-
bay corporations and deaths in public hospitals in Rajasthan. The World Health
Organization provides some confirmation of the virtual eradication of malaria from
India by noting a hundredfold decline in reported cases between 1952 and 1972.
World Health Organization, Fifth Report 011 the World Health Situation, Official
Records no. 225 (1975), p. 142.
jBunle (1954).
kDeaths under age 2 only.
IMalaria and undefined fevers.
mpneumonia and bronchitis.




Mexico City, Mexico, Mexico, Mexico City- Decline,
Cause of Death 1904-12" 1922-25j 1972b Mexico Mexico
Typhoid .068 .341 .065 0 1.7
Typhus 1.363 .040 .001 4.1 .2
Malaria .076 1.471 .001 .2 9.0
Smallpox .733 .826 0 2.2 5.0
Measles .290 .427 .219 .2 1.3
Whooping cough .284 .938 .080 .6 5.2
Diphtheria .169 .062 .002 .5 .4
Influenza/pneumonia/
bronchitis 7.838 3.213 1.664 18.6 9.4
Respiratory tuberculosis 2.485 .653 .152 7.0 3.1
Diarrhea, dysentery,
cholera nostras 9.785 1.861k 1.337 25.4
Cholera n.a. n.a.
Total 42.314 25.489 9.081
British India,
Cause ofDeath Guiana, Guyana, % of 1898- India, % of
1911-20f 1967g Decline I907h 1963i Difference
Typhoid n.a. n.a.
Typhus n.a. n.a.
Malaria 4.1851 0 18.1 6.0-8.7 0 24.3-35.2
Smallpox n.a. .27 .08 .8
Measles n.a. n.a.
Whooping cough n.a. n.a.
Diphtheria n.a. n.a.
Influenza/pneumonia/
bronchitis 3.680m .055 15.7 n.a.
Respiratory tuberculosis 1.432° .024 6.1 n.a.
Diarrhea, dysentery,
cholera nostras 2.780 .026 11.9 1.96 .14 7.4
Cholera n.a. 1.66 1.18 1.9
Plague n.a. 1.82 0 7.3
Total 30.049 6.987 43.5 18.8
about 3/1,000 in Guatemala (Meegama 1967, pp. 231-33), by 5-9
points in Mauritius (Titmuss and Abel-Smith 1968, pp. 49-50), and
by 2-3/1,000 in Venezuela (Pampana 1954, p. 504).
The importance of malaria reduction as a source of declining mortal-
ity in a country obviously depends upon initial endemicity and the
success of antimalarial campaigns. Southern Africa, southern Latin
America, and northern Asia were never seriously afflicted with the dis-
ease; malaria in tropical Africa is highly endemic but, with few excep-299 Mortality Declines in Less Developed Countries
tions, it has not been successfully attacked (World Health Organization
1975a). A valuable compilation by Faust (1941, p. 12) suggests that
recorded crude death rates from malaria in Mexico, Central America,
and the West Indies during the 1930s, before any inroads had been
made against the disease in rural areas, was 1.66/1,000. But he con-
siders this "a figure probably far too low." The recorded CDR from
malaria in cities of Burma in 1939 was 2.14 (Simmons et al. 1944, p.
11). The preprogram malarial CDR in Venezuela was 1.73/1,000 (Pam-
pana 1954, p. 504). But recorded levels are often greatly in error.
Newman calculates for Ceylon that each death assigned to malaria rep-
resented approximately four deaths that were directly or indirectly
caused by it. But such an inflation factor is simply not tenable in Guate-
mala or Venezuela, where contemporaneous declines in crude death
rates and malarial crude death rates suggest that a 2:1 ratio is the most
that could have been sustained. Part of the inflation factor reflects
malaria's role as "the great debilitator," but another part may be spuri-
ous. Spraying with residual insecticides reduces not only malaria but
other vector-borne diseases such as yellow fever, typhus, and especially
diarrheal disease. As Newman points out, an indirect approach that
bases estimates on relations between regional changes in aggregate mor-
tality and changes in spleen rates may well overascribe mortality decline
to malaria reductions (but not to insecticide campaigns themselves).
Finally, there is an often-quoted estimate, the basis of which is un-
known, that worldwide malarial deaths have declined from 2.5 million
per year to less than 1 million (Lancet 1970, p. 599), figures suggesting
for LDCs a decline in crude death rates on the order of 1/1,000. The
2.5 million estimate evidently first appears in Pampana and Russell
(1955) and presumably applies to 1955. Russell put the figure at at
least 3 million for 1943 (1943, p. 601).
There is obviously much work to be done on this issue. In the present
state of semi-ignorance, it seems judicious to adopt a range of CDR
declines of 2-5/I,000, within which the twentieth-century LDC mor-
tality decline attributable to antimalarial programs seems to have a
better than even chance of falling. Sri Lanka, the best-docume,1ted case,
falls within this range, and Sri Lanka was apparently intermediate in
terms of initial endemicity, although the program there probably enjoyed
unusual success and malaria reduction may not be solely responsible
for the mortality decline produced by insecticide spraying. The range is
also consistent with the apparently widespread malarial CDR declines
of 1.5-2.0/1,000 and with inflation factors of 1.4-2.5.
These assorted scraps of information are pieced together in table 5.3,
where diseases that seem in the main to be responsible for mortality
declines in LDCs between 1900 and 1970 are classified into three groups
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ously highly tentative but nevertheless the first that appears to have been
offered-of the relative importance of the various diseases in the decline
is also supplied. The category totals are somewhat more robust than the
figures for individual diseases because diagnostic confusions, disease
interactions, and program externalities are more likely to occur within
groups than between groups. Since progress was very slow between 1900
and 1935, the listing may serve as an adequate representation of declines
between 1935 and 1970 as well. Finally, some indication of the public
health and medical instruments that have been deployed against the
various diseases is also provided. The modes of transmission that are
listed are not mutually exclusive or exhaustive, but the classification is
not seriously distortive.
5.1.3 Influences Operating on the Various Causes of Death
Mortality from every disease listed in table 5.3 would be expected to
decline when personal living standards rise. Of the many linkages, prob-
ably the most important are those between nutritional status and influ-
enza/pneumonia/bronchitis, diarrheal disease, and respiratory tubercu-
losis. The mechanisms of effect are not well known, but it appears that
protein malnutrition impairs the production of circulating antibodies in
response to bacterial and viral antigens and that undernutrition can pro-
duce atrophy of the organs responsible for the immune response (World
Health Organization 1972, pp. 24-25). There is no question of the
importance of poor nutrition as a factor underlying high mortality rates
in LDCs. The PAHO study of child mortality in thirteen Latin American
projects found that immaturity or malnutrition was an associated or
underlying cause of 57% of the deaths before age 5 (World Health
Organization 1974a, p. 279). Immaturity is in turn a frequent product
of maternal malnourishment (Mata et al. 1972). The problem is appar-
ently equally severe in Africa, although the data are much more frag-
mentary (Bailey 1975). Diet supplementation programs in Peru (Baertl
et al. 1970) and Guatemala (Ascoli et al. 1967; Scrimshaw 1970)
significantly reduced child mortality in test populations, but, oddly,
without having substantial effects on indexes of child physical develop-
ment. Despite the improvement, mortality and morbidity in the Guate-
malan villages remained "shockingly high," which was attributed to
irregular participation in the feeding program and to the continued
heavy burden of infection to which the children were subject (Scrim-
shaw 1970, pp. 1689-90).
But nutritional status is not exclusively determined by diet, nor is
diet determined only by the availability of calories or protein. There
is now extensive evidence that infectious diseases themselves are an
extremely important source of malnourishment, independent of the
child's nutritional state at the time of attack (Mata et aI. 1972; Scrim-302 Samuel H. Preston
shaw 1970; World Health Organization 1972, p. 27). Infection increases
metabolic demands and often reduces the absorption of nutrients and
increases their excretion. Nutritional intake can also be reduced by
nausea or through customs denying food to the sick. Infections among
pregnant women can reduce birthweights and, among new mothers, milk
secretion (Mata et al. 1972; Bailey 1975). Gordon (1969, p. 218)
suggests that diet fails by far to explain all the prevalent malnourish-
ment in LDCs. The frequency of inappropriate nutritional practices
despite adequate food supplies does not require emphasis (Bailey 1975;
Food and Agriculture Organization 1975). The importance of nutri-
tional practices is indicated by the reported reversal of expected social
class differences in infant mortality in Chile, a condition attributed to
earlier weaning among children of upper-class women (Plank and Mila-
nesi 1973). The point is simply that, even if nutritional status were the
only influence on mortality from a disease, mortality declines from that
cause do not necessarily imply that an improvement in food supplies
has occurred. Nutritional practices and exogenous declines in the inci-
dence of other infections must also be consi'dered candidates for expla-
nation. The "subsistence level" of food production is obviously fictitious
if it is presumed to represent a fixed requirement that is independent of
the state of prophylactic or nutritional arts.
Despite the undoubted influence of nutritional intake and other com-
ponents of general living standards on mortality, it is clear from table
5.3 that many other influences have also been at work. Obvious as it
may be, it is easy to forget that death from an infectious disease involves
an encounter between a pathogenic organism and a vulnerable human
host. The rate of death can be altered by changing the rate or terms of
the encounter without any prior change in the host. It is not possible
and is probably not necessary to document individually the preventive
and curative measures that have been utilized for this purpose. With the
exception of influenza/pneumonia/bronchitis, it seems likely that pre-
ventive measures have been more effective than curative ones.
That preventive measures have been widely deployed in each of the
three categories can be demonstrated relatively easily. At the end of
1964, 1.935 billion persons lived in areas that were originally malarious.
Of these, 41 % were living in areas from which malaria had been eradi-
cated; 16% were living in areas where incidence was very low and was
being controlled by case detection and treatment; 24% were living in
areas protected by extensive mosquito control measures; and 19% were
living in areas without specific antimalarial measures, most of these in
tropical Africa (World Health Organization 1975a). The cost of pro-
grams producing virtually complete eradication has been estimated at
10-30 cents per capita per year, with programs probably extending over
a two- to three-year period and a continuing annual cost of 5 cents per303 Mortality Declines in Less Developed Countries
capita required for surveillance thereafter (Pampana and Russell 1955,
table 1, provides the most complete cost compilation).
India has vaccinated 170 million persons against tuberculosis and in
1968 alone vaccinated 83 million against smallpox (World Health Or-
ganization 1975b, p. 142). It has finally succeeded in eliminating small-
pox completely, as has every other country. Colombia dispensed 5.9
million vaccinations in 1972, one-third of the population size; Egypt
vaccinated 15 million persons against cholera in the same year and 25
million against smallpox in 1970. All primary-school entrants in the
Philippines are vaccinated against tuberculosis. Barbados has compul-
sory immunization against diphtheria, polio, smallpox, and tetanus upon
school entrance (World Health Organization 1975). An expert commit-
tee assembled by WHO estimated that 80% of the 70 million children
reaching age one in LDCs each year could be immunized against mea-
sles, polio, tuberculosis, pertussis, tetanus, diphtheria, and smallpox at
a cost, exclusive of personnel, of $37.5-$60 million, or $0.67-$1.07
apiece (World Health Organization, 1975c, p. 2).
Conditions of water supply and sewage disposal have also been mark-
edly improved, despite continued abysmal conditions in many areas.
Many of the improvements were normal and integral parts of economic
expansion and hence cannot be specifically interpreted as public health
interventions of an unprecedented sort. WHO surveys of government
officials in 1962 and 1970 indicated that the proportion of LDC urban
populations served by house connections to public water supply in-
creased from 0.33 to 0.50 during this eight-year period for the seventy-
five countries that replied in both years (World Health Organization
1973, p. 726). No rural population comparisons could be made, but in
1970 only 12% of rural LDC populations had "reasonable access" to
community water supply (public fountain or standpipe within 200 meters
of a house). The figure was only 6% in India (World Health Organi-
zation 1973, pp. 727, 729). New urban house connections were esti-
mated to cost an average of $35 per capita, and providing rural residents
with easy access to safe water to cost $12 per capita. In 1970, 69% of
LDC urban populations had sewage disposal facilities (27% were con-
nected to public sewerage and 42% had private household systems).
New connections to urban public sewerage cost an average of $29 per
head. Only 8% of the rural population was judged to have adequate
sewage disposal, although the average cost of providing such facilities
was estimated at only $4 per capita (World Health Organization 1973,
pp. 732-33, 738-43). No trends in sewage facilities could be estab-
lished, but improvement is probably fairly rapid in urban areas and slow
in rural areas. Clearly, the initial cost of such programs is considerably
higher than that for programs of vector control and immunization. Water
supply improvements were among the very first changes to modify mor-304 Samuel H. Preston
tality patterns in European countries in the mid-nineteenth century. But
they are lagging relative to other improvements in LDCs. This may
explain why diarrheal disease remains relatively more prominent as a
contributor to total mortality in LDCs than it was in European countries
at the same general mortality level (Preston and Nelson 1974).
With the exception of water and sewerage improvements and smallpox
vaccination, the techniques of preventive and curative health care that
have been widely deployed in LDCs are twentieth-century products.
Virtually all were facilitated by ultimate acceptance of the revolutionary
germ theory of disease at the turn of the century. Even smallpox eradi-
cation has benefited from technical improvements such as freeze-dried
vaccine and the forked needle (Foege et al. 1975). The next section
attempts to identify the relative importance of these technical improve-
ments, as typically embodied in government health programs enjoying
some measure of external assistance or support, in LDC mortality im-
provements during the last three decades.
5.1.4 Structural Changes in Relations between Mortality and
Other Development Indexes
That mortality reductions have not merely been residual by-products
of socioeconomic development is best illustrated by showing that major
structural changes have occurred in the relationship between mortality
and other indexes of development. Important technical changes and
exogenous increases in government health commitment or foreign health
assistance should result in a shift in the average level of life expectancy
that corresponds to a particular level of other development indicators.
Preston (l975a) suggested that such a change had occurred in the rela-
tion between mortality and national income, and this section will attempt
to supplement that observation by introducing new variables and a
larger sample of countries. Data have been gathered on national levels
of life expectancy, per capita income (in 1970 U.S. dollars), daily
calorie consumption, and literacy for thirty-six nations in or about 1940,
including seventeen LDCs and several others that today would be classi-
fied as LDCs if 1940 conditions had persisted. The LDC estimates of
life expectancy are based largely upon indirect demographic techniques
such as intercensal survival analysis rather than upon vital statistics.
Data on these same variables have been generated for 120 nations in or
around 1970. The data and sources are presented in appendix tables
5.A.l and 5.A.2.
A preliminary indication that structural changes have occurred is
presented in table 5.4. Countries are cross-classified by level of per
capita national income (in 1970 U.S. dollars) and by daily calorie
consumption per head. Complete information was available for only
twenty-nine countries in 1940. Nevertheless, it is clear that, within every305 Mortality Declines in Less Developed Countries
Table 5.4 Mean Life Expectancy at Birth of Countries in Various Ranges
of National Income and Calorie Consumption, 1940 and 1970
Daily
Calories National Income per Capita in 1970 U.S. Dollars
Per Capita <150 150-299 300-699 700+
42.7 (17) 51.5 (8) 53.3 (5) 69.5 (1) 47.5 (31)
<2,100
38.3 (5) 36.0 (1) (0) (0) 37.9 (6)
42.6 (16) 49.9 (14) 56.2 (7) 71.4 (2) 49.1 (39)
2,100-2,399
40.0 (1) 43.9 (2) 46.1 (1) (0) 43.4 (4)
45.4 (1) 57.9 (8) 61.3 (10) 68.0 (7) 61.4 (26)
2,400-2,899
(0) 44.1 (2) 50.4 (4) 59.6 (2) 51.1 (8)
(0) (0) (0) 71.6 (24) 71.6 (24)
2,900+
(0) (0) 58.7 (2) 65.2 (9) 64.0 (11 )
--------
42.7 (34) 52.4 (30) 57.8 (22) 70.8 (34) 55.9 (120)
38.6 (6) 42.4 (5) 52.2 (7) 64.1 (11 ) 52.2 (29)
Source: Appendix tables 5.A.l and 5.A.2.
Note: 1970 countries appear in the top rows, 1940 countries in the bottom rows.
The number of countries is shown in parentheses.
one of the nine cells where both 1940 and 1970 populations appear,
average life expectancy was higher at the later date. The average intra-
cell gain is 8.7 years of life expectancy.
A somewhat more precise indication of the magnitude of structural
changes can be obtained by regressing life expectancy on income, cal-
ories, and literacy separately for 1940 and 1970 observations. Because
of nonlinearities expected on obvious inductive and deductive grounds,
natural logarithms of calorie consumption and income are used as re-
gressors. Daily calorie consumption is measured from 1,500, approxi-
mately the average level required to meet minimum daily metabolic
demands. Literacy, a personal dichotomous variable, cannot act non-
linearly at the individual level, since it takes on only two values. Barring
spillover effects whose existence in income relations was called into
question in section A, the proportion literate should be linearly related
to life expectancy at the aggregate level. No claim is made that the
resulting equations are perfectly specified, but simply that the socio-
economic variables included are the only ones available in the 1930s.
It seems unlikely that relations between terms omitted and terms present306 Samuel H. Preston
would have changed in such as way as to influence the outcomes de-
scribed below.
The equations as estimated by ordinary least squares are the fol-
lowing:5
1970: eOo = 17.1464+ 4.2488 X InY+.2086 X Ll-T
(7.4090) (.6524) (.0212)
+ .3170 X In CAL
(1.3492)
N = 120, R2= .860
R2 = .858
1940: eOo = -13.1035+ 5.4352 X InY+ .1654 X LIT
(18.5102) (2.3860) (.0626)
+ 2.9470 X In CAL
(3.7176)
N = 36, R2= .856
R2 = .845,
where eOo = life expectancy at birth, average male and female
Y = national income per capita, 1970 U.S. dollars
LIT = percentage literate of the adult population
CAL = excess of daily calorie consumption per capita
over 1,500.
Coefficients of all three variables in both equations are properly
signed. The explanatory power of the regression equations is virtually
identical for the two years. Income and literacy terms are highly signifi-
cant in both periods and retain approximately the same magnitude. This
stability was unexpected because of the high degree of colinearity among
regressors. The coefficients indicate that a 10 percentage point increase
in literacy is associated at both points with a gain in life expectancy of
approximately 2 years, and that a 10% gain-in national income by itself
increases life expectancy by approximately one-half year. Coefficients
of the calorie term decrease over time but are insignificant in both
periods. It is very unlikely that the availability of calories for daily con-
sumption has no influence on mortality. The calorie variable is probably
subject to greater measurement error than the other two, and the influ-
ence of calorie availability is probabiy being reflected through them.
The constant term increases by about 30 years between 1940 and 1970,
although by itself this change is not readily interpreted, since the zero-
points on variables are well below the range of observed experience.
The hazards of extrapolation are shown by the negative (though insig-
nificant) intercept for 1940.6307 Mortality Declines in Less Developed Countries
The substantive significance of the structural shift, as reflected pri-
marily in the intercept, is probably best illustrated in the following way.
Each of the 120 countries in 1970, including 94 LDCs, can supply
estimates for each of the three regressors. It is therefore possible to
estimate what life expectancy would be for every country at its current
developmental level if no structural change had occurred in the relation
between mortality and socioeconomic development. This estimate is
simply obtained by substituting values of the three regressors for 1970
into the 1940 regression equation. Differences between actual life ex-
pectancy and that predicted if 1940 relations had continued to prevail
indicate the amount of change in life expectancy attributable to the
structural shift. A weighted average of such differences will indicate
the importance of the shift for LDCs as a whole.7 Results of this exer-
cise are presented in table 5.5.
Estimates presented in this table indicate that life expectancy for
LDCs as a unit (exclusive of China, North Korea, and North Vietnam)
would have been 8.66 years lower in 1970-75 if life expectancy had
continued to be related to other development indexes as it was in 1940.
Excluding South Vietnam, where special factors were obviously distort-
ing life expectancy, the figure is 8.84. This is an estimate of the amount
of increase in life expectancy that is attributable to factors exogenous
to national levels of income, literacy, and calorie consumption.s What
fraction of the total gain in life expectancy during the period this 8.84-
year structural shift represents is difficult to assess. WHO estimates that
life expectancy in LDCs was 32 years in 1935-39 (30 in Africa and
Asia and 40 in Latin America) and 49.6 years in 1965-70 (World
Health Organization 1974, p. 23). The earlier figure is based on very
little information, but if we accept it, the implication is that the struc-
tural change accounts for about half (50.2%) of the total gain in life
expectancy during these nearly equivalent 30-year periods. This estimate
is lower than the 79.5% (9.7/12.2) figures estimated for MDCs and
LDCs combined by Preston (1975, p. 238) not so much because the
estimated deoo attributed to structural shifts differ (the difference is in
fact only 0.86 years) but because the estimated gains in life expectancy
differ (12.2 years for the world as a whole between 1938 and 1963 by
Preston versus 17.6 years for LDCs between 1935-39 and 1965-70
by WHO). Part of the discrepancy in the estimates probably results
from differences in the universe covered. Because MDCs had achieved
by 1940 levels of developmental indicators high enough that relatively
little gain in life expectancy was to be expected from advances in living
standards, it is likely that exogenous factors represented a larger fraction
of the gains that occurred there than they did in LDCs. Another part
may reflect differences in the periods covered, since the present estimate
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.310 Samuel H. Preston
tality decline in LDCs has slowed in the past decade (Hansluwka 1975;
World Bank 1975) imply that the shift in the mortality/development
relation may have essentially ended by the early 1960s, while gains in
living standards continue to exert an influence on mortality. In any case,
the estimated amount of the structural shift is consistent between the
two estimates at about 9 years of life expectancy at birth.
The structural shift has evidently been least pronounced for African
countries and most pronounced for Latin America. Africa has unques-
tionably experienced the least penetration by modern public health mea-
sures of any region. The problem is not simply poverty but also a widely
/ dispersed population that increases program costs (World Health Or-
ganization 1975b, p. 17). Several of the African countries have lower
___ life expectancies in 1970-75 than could have been expected based on
1940 relations. The apparent advantage enjoyed by Latin American
countries may be due to their special relations with the United States.
The United States has been by far the largest bilateral donor in inter-
national health aid, and the bulk of aid appears to go to Latin American
countries, either directly or through the Pan American Health Organi-
zation (World Bank 1975, pp. 68-69). It is worth noting that, of the
ninety-four LDCs, Sri Lanka and Mauritius are two of the four whose
estimated structural changes are largest. It is unfortunate that so much
attention has focused on these unusual cases.
Attributing to all countries the relations prevailing in countries for
which data are available is always risky. The preceding analysis of
change can be complemented by one that focuses exclusively on the
cases that can be documented. Each of the thirty-six countries providing
data in 1940 can also supply data in 1970. According to the previous
formulation, we should expect Lleoo to be linearly related to Lll nY, Lli n
CAL, and LlLIT, with a relatively large positive intercept reflecting the
structural shift. In the first specification of the model, we add three
terms believed to reflect factors responsible for a portion of the struc-
tural shift. The first (MAL) is an estimate of the degree of malarial
endemicity in 1940, which is a proxy for the effect of antimalarial pro-
grams on Lleoo. Each of the thirty-six countries with endemic malaria
has had a major antimalarial campaign. It is hoped that the coefficient
of this term will provide a clearer indication of the effect of antimalarial
activities on gains in life expectancy than was previously available. The
second (AID) is an estimate of the average annual per capita nonmili-
tary aid in United States dollars received from bilateral and multilateral
donors between 1954 and 1972. The third (WAT) is an estimate of per
capita aid received for water and sewerage projects between 1965 and
1970 (U.S. dollars). The latter two variables are assumed to be proxies
for the amount of total per capita health aid received between 1940311 Mortality Declines in Less Developed Countries
and 1970. Their values are generally highest for the Latin American
countries. Values of these variables are presented in appendix table
5.A.3.
The estimated equation with all six terms present is the following:~
Aeoo = 6.5212+ 3.4500 X A1nY+ .0354 X ALIT
(2.8468) (2.4111) (.0927)
+ .5605 X A1n CAL
(4.9362)




Each of the coefficients has the expected positive sign. The coefficient
of income remains similar in absolute value to that estimated in the
cross-sectional regressions, but that of literacy declines by a factor of five
and calories remain an insubstantial factor. Receipt of external aid
contributes positively but insignificantly to mortality improvement. The
most interesting result refers to the constant term. For a country essen-
tially free of malaria in 1940 (MAL = 0), it is estimated that life ex-
pectancy would have increased by 6.52 years in the absence of socio-
economic development and external aid during the three decades. For a
country in which malaria was highly endemic (MAL = 3), the corre-
sponding gain is 15.92 years, of which 9.40 is attributable to factors
associated with malarial endemicity. The average life expectancy for the
seventeen LDCs was 39.29 in 1940 and 59.42 in 1970, giving an average
gain of 20.13 years. The average malaria endemicity score for these
seventeen was 2.59. Of the total gain in eOn, 8.11 years (3.1328 X 2.59),
or 40%, is attributable to factors associated with malarial endemicity,
and the constant term of 6.5 years, or 23%, represents other exogenous
factors. The sum of 72% is considerably higher than that implied by the
previous procedure. The external aid terms contribute an additional
1.13 years, or 5.6%.10
Whether or not antimalarial programs themselves produced the gain
of 8.11 years attributed to malarial endemicity remains in serious doubt.
The malaria score is correlated with life expectancy in 1940 at -.873.
It is thus acting as a proxy for the initial level of mortality from a host
of potentially eliminable infectious and parasitic diseases. When the ini-
tial level of life expectancy is entered as an independent variable, the
magnitude of the structural change remains roughly the same but the
portion attributable to the malarial term declines to zero:312 Samuel H. Preston
lleOo = 31.4722+ 3.6048 X IllnY+ .0430 X IlLIT
(8.5108) (2.0533) (.0790)
- .9865 X IlCAL
(4.2327)
- .0211 X MAL + .0750 X AID+ .2939 X WAT
(1.3059) (.2036) (.3139)




Other coefficients are not affected in such a way as to substantially
alter interpretations, but the coefficient of malarial endemicity becomes
effectively zero. The amount of structural change for the seventeen
LDCs, the gain that is not accounted for by changes in Y, LIT, or CAL,
is 16.46 years of life, or 81.8% of the average gain during the period.ll
The estimated structural change is close to that estimated directly above,
but malaria's role in it is now negligible. When malarial endemicity is
operationalized as a series of dummy variables, none of the dummy
coefficients is significant, and the relation between mortality change and
endemicity is nonmonotonic. Other functional forms and variable oper-
ationalizations should be investigated; at the moment all we can con-
clude is that the longitudinal analysis provides no better fix on malaria's
role than the largely inconclusive cause-of-death analysis.
Two estimates have been advanced of the fraction of LDC gains in
life expectancy between 1940 and 1970 that are attributable to struc-
tural change. The first estimate of one-half was based on a regression-
decomposition technique that assumed all nations had relations between
mortality and development indexes in 1940 identical to those prevailing
in nations that could supply data for that year. The second estimate of
approximately 80% was based solely upon examination of trends in the
latter group. There is an important technical reason to favor the former
estimate, namely, that measurement error is likely to be a more impor-
tant source of distortion in longitudinal than in cross-sectional data.
Measurement error biases coefficients toward zero. If random measure-
ment error were all that was reflected in our measured changes in in-
come, literacy, and calorie consumption, then the entire change in life
expectancy would be absorbed in the constant term and attributed to
structural change, regardless of the actual importance of these factors.
Development levels are undoubtedly better measured than development
rates, giving greater stability to the analysis based on a comparison of
cross sections. There are, however, indications that a fraction of the gain313 Mortality Declines in Less Developed Countries
larger than one-half would be attributed to structural shifts if analysis
had focused more narrowly on the period between 1940 and 1960.
The estimate of one-half is roughly consistent with the preceding
cause-of-death analysis. Influenza/pneumonia/bronchitis has accounted
for perhaps a third of the mortality decline. No effective preventive
measures have been deployed against these diseases, the effectiveness of
immunization being minimal, and there are suggestions that antibiotics,
sulfa drugs, and curative services are not widely enough available in
LDCs to have substantially altered the disease picture (Sharpston 1976;
Bryant 1969, pp. 314-23). Diarrheal diseases probably account for
another 9% or so of the decline, and the principal method of control
has been improvements in water supply and sewerage that, because of
their expense, are closely associated with economic development.12 It is
likely that social and economic development-especially as reflected in
water systems, nutrition, housing, and personal sanitary knowledge-
have operated largely through these diseases. In the case of other dis-
eases it appears that programs of a narrowly public health nature that
have embodied inexpensive new techniques, especially vector control
and immunization, have been the decisive forces in mortality reductions.
5.1.5 The Role of MDCs in LDC Gains
Many have argued that MDCs have played a decisive role in the
mortality declines experienced by LDCs, although the case has not been
well documented. Certain of the influences are clear enough. Sulfa
drugs, antibiotics, and most vaccines and insecticides, including DDT,
have been developed in laboratories within MDCs. MDCs contributed
5,764 technical assistance workers in health services to LDCs in 1968
(Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, n.d., pp.
276-77). Governmental health agencies were often created under colo-
nial auspices. The role of external financing has also been stressed, but
the accounts have focused on the dramatic examples in relatively small
countries where international campaigns have often been undertaken
largely for their demonstration value.
Health assistance in the developing world began with the work of
medical missionaries, who were established in the Philippines in 1577
and in China by 1835 (Maramag 1965; Bowers 1973) .13 The early
efforts of colonial governments were designed primarily to protect the
colonials from epidemic diseases (Beck 1970). Correspondingly, coop-
erative international health efforts principally attempted to protect Eu-
rope and North America from imported cholera, plague, and yellow
fever (Howard-Jones 1974). An evolving social conscience in the inter-
war years led to greater concern with the health of the native population
itself and to the establishment of local medical colleges (Beck 1970).
The most effective international efforts of the period were undoubtedly314 Samuel H. Preston
those of the Rockefeller Foundation, which led a successful campaign
to eradicate yellow fever from Latin American cities in 1916-23, re-
pelled the invasion of Anopheles gambiae into Brazil in 1938, financed
medical schools around the world, and was "probably the largest single
factor in improving the public health education of the world up to the
creation of the WHO" (Goodman 1971, pp. 381, 266, 377-82). Its
antimalarial activities began in 1915 and included demonstrations of
the superior cost effectiveness of vector control compared with treat-
ment and the feasibility of complete eradication. The antimalarial activ-
ities were considered by Russell, one of the world's leading malariolo-
gists, to be of fundamental importance in ultimate control of the disease.
"In instance after instance the foundation provided the catalyst, or the
inexpensive mainspring, or the seed money that resulted in control of
the disease" (Russell 1968, p. 644).
The total amount of money appropriated by the Rockefeller Founda-
tion from 1914 to 1954 for antimalarial activities, exclusive of salaries
and overhead was only $5 million (Russell 1968, p. 644). This is a
vivid illustration that contributions to mortality change are inaccurately
reflected on financial ledgers. International aid for health purposes is a
small part of total health expenditures in LDCs and probably always
has been. But its cost effectiveness has certainly far surpassed the aver-
age for internally financed appropriations, which are too often focused
on expensive curative services in urban areas.14
Only crude indications are available of the relative magnitudes of
internal and external sources of health expenditures in LDCs. In 1970,
government health expenditures were estimated for LDCs containing
1.89 billion people. Total government expenditure on health in these
areas came to $7.67 billion, or about $4 per capita.15 Private health
expenditures in LDCs are probably slightly larger than public expendi-
tures, judging from comparisons that can be made in seven countries.16
Addition of private and public expenditure in countries not represented
would bring the total annual expenditure perhaps to the range of $20-
30 billion.
In contrast, the largest single source of international assistance for
health, the World Health Organization, dispersed only $115 million in
1972, a figure that includes family planning activities and some dispers-
als to MDCs (World Bank 1975, pp. 68-69). The annual budget of
the World Health Organization in 1970 was less than that of Massa-
chusetts General Hospital! (Goodman 1971, p. 223). Of its regular
budget, the United States contributed 31 % and the USSR 13%, with
no other country making a contribution larger than 7% (Goodman
1971, p. 220). The second largest source of international assistance in
1972, USAID, contributed $42 million. An together, the ten largest
multilateral or bilateral sources of health aid contributed $300.7 million315 Mortality Declines in Less Developed Countries
in international assistance for health programs in 1972 (World Bank
1975, p. 68), probably between 1% and 2% of total health expendi-
tures in LDCs. To this should be added a portion of the $79 million in
loans and credits made by the World Bank for water supply and sewer-
age construction in that year (World Bank 1975, p. 48).
It seems very likely, then, that total external health aid received by
LDCs is less than 3% of their total health expenditures. The figure may
have been somewhat higher earlier in the postwar period. The cumula-
tive United States contribution to antimalarial activities through national
research and international assistance has been estimated to be about
one-half billion dollars (Russell 1968), but the annual contribution has
declined drastically (Weller 1974; World Health Organization 1975a).
But even the cumulative total is a paltry figure compared with annual
expenditures in LDCs themselves. MDC contributions to mortality de-
clines in LDCs have not been primarily financial; according to the esti-
mates of the preceding section, the financial contributions are associated
with an increase in eOo of about one year in the seventeen LDCs between
1940 and 1970. Instead, they seem to have consisted of the develop-
ment of low-cost health measures exploitable on a massive scale, dem-
onstration of their effectiveness in relatively small areas, training and
provision of personnel, and occasionally the initiation of large-scale
programs whose major cost was often absorbed by the recipient coun-
try,17 When action appeared to be remarkably cost effective and timely,
such as a campaign to eradicate smallpox from West and Central Africa,
the entire burden of effort was occasionally absorbed by an MDC (Foege
et al. 1975).
5.2 Consequences of Mortality Reductions
In this section we can do no more than begin to sketch in the major
influences of these mortality declines on populations of the less devel-
oped world, since these declines affect virtually every aspect of individual
and collective life in a manner that undoubtedly varies with a host of
initial conditions present in the population. It is probably wise to begin
with the most concrete and least variable effects, the demographic ones.
Other things remaining the same, mortality declines increase the rate
of population growth. The initial effect obviously is to increase the crude
rate of natural increase by the absolute amount of the decline in the
crude death rate. To a close approximation, the long-run effect of a
permanent decline is to increase the rate of natural increase by the aver-
age (unweighted) decline in age-specific death rates between age zero
and the mean age of childbearing (Preston 1974). This effect is almost
fully realized within two generations. In neither case is the growth re-
sponse strongly conditioned by the prevailing level of fertility. Not a316 Samuel H. Preston
shred of doubt remains that the vast majority of the acceleration in
world population growth during the twentieth century is attributable to
mortality decline rather than to a rise in fertility.
It is important to recognize that changes in rates of population growth
typically have very different effects on demographic, economic, and
social processes depending on their source. Coale and Hoover (1958)
in their classic study were careful to point out that they were studying
the economic implications of variation in fertility, but the study has
often been misinterpreted as suggesting the deleterious effects of rapid
population growth per se. Application of a modified Coale-Hoover
model by Barlow (1967, 1968) demonstrated much more ambiguous
economic effects when the source of growth acceleration was mortality
decline. Loose discussions of relations between population and economic
growth are usually aimed implicitly at the fertility component, even
though it is mortality variation that has been the root of trends in popu-
lation growth.
The fundamental reason why effects differ is a difference in the ages
of persons affected. Changes in fertility initially affect only the number
of zero-year-olds, and permanent changes permanently affect the age
distribution of the population. Mortality changes typically affect all ages,
and age distributional changes are relatively minor (Coale 1956; Stol-
nitz 1956). Such as they are, the short-run age distributional changes
induced by mortality decline typically increase the proportion of the
population at ages below 5 or 10 and above 40 and decrease the pro-
portion at other ages. The pertinent index is the age-specific death rate,
ILa;. When this declines by more than the population-weighted average,
the proportion of the population in the immediately succeeding ages will
rise. Since mortality declines have tended to be largest in absolute (but
not proportional) terms at the extremes of life, the dependency burden
initially rises. The long-run effect of a permanent decline in mortality is
typically to increase the proportion of the population at ages below 20
and above 75. The pertinent age-specific index here is the cumulative
change (unweighted) in age-specific death rates since age zero relative
to an appropriately defined average (Preston 1974). The long-run effect
on the dependency burden is also positive. With the gross reproduction
rate fixed at 2.5, a rise in female life expectancy from 30 to 50 to 70
years in stable populations characterized by "West" mortality patterns
increases the ratio of those outside of labor force age (15-64) to those
within from 0.635 to 0.764 to 0.847 (Coale and Demeny 1966, pp. 82,
98, 114). All of this increase is sustained in the ages below 15. These
changes are not trivial, but they are rather small relative to those in-
duced by movements of fertility within its observed range.
It follows from this discussion and the formal analysis that supports
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termed a "neutral" decline), the age composition of the population will
be unaffected in both the short run and the long run. The probability
x+n
of survival from age x to age x + n is equal to exp {- f p.(t)dt},
'" where p.(t) is the death rate at exact age t. A decline in mortality by
amount k at all ages will raise all n-year survival probabilities by the
factor, exp {kn}. Since the population at each age grows by the same
factor (including infants via the greater survivorship of prospective par-
ents), the proportionate age distribution is unaffected. Barring behav-
ioral changes, a decline that is neutrally distributed among population
subgroups, however defined (e.g., occupational or educational groups),
will not affect population composition. The point is worth emphasis: it
is differential mortality change that affects population composition. A
change that is equally shared affects only size and growth. To the degree
that typical mortality changes have been differentially distributed, the
first-order changes induced in population composition have been eco-
nomically unfavorable. Not only have the very young and the very old
profited disproportionately, but so have women and unskilled or semi-
skilled workers.18 Unlike programs of human resource development,
which usually aim directly at an upgrading of population composition
in ways that relate to production, programs of mortality decline have
typically increased population size and reduced, at least initially, the
desirability of its configuration.
Although mortality and fertility variation have very different effects
on population composition, the mechanism by which they influence
population size is the same in the long run: changes in the annual num-
ber of births. The principal long-run effect of mortality decline on popu-
lation size arises not from the greater survivorship of persons who
would have been born in any event, but from the larger number of births
that are produced. To see this clearly, suppose that a neutral mortality
change occurs to an initially stable population such that all ages experi-
ence a permanent reduction in death rates of .02. If age-specific fertility
rates remain unchanged, the rate of population growth will increase by
.02 and the rate of increase in the annual number of births will also rise
by .02. Consider the number of 20-year-olds in the population 60 years
after the mortality decline. The original number born into this cohort
will be larger as a result of the mortality decline by [e·02(401_1] =
123%, whereas their improved survivorship after birth will have in-
creased their numbers by [e·02U01_1] = 49%, a growth factor less than
half as large. More than half the members of the cohort would not have
been born had mortality not declined. This fraction continues to grow
over time, but the improved survivorship factor does not. Stated more
vividly, any LDC child "saved" from death today adds only one to the
population size for a time. But the progeny of that child will ultimately318 Samuel H. Preston
be infinite in numbers if current rates of mortality and fertility are main-
tained by all generations. The prevailing practice in health economics
of ignoring the offspring of the population "saved" seriously misrepre-
sents the effect of health programs on populations (see reviews in Weis-
brod 1975 and Klarman 1967).
5.2.1 Economic and Behavioral Responses
In discussing aggregate economic and behavioral responses to mor-
tality decline, it is useful to recognize that all of the responses must
make themselves felt through one of four indexes. This follows directly
from a formal identity:
CDR = CBR + CRNM - Rp + R pc'
where CDR, CRR, CRNM = crude rates of death, birth, and net
migration
R p, Rpc = proportionate rate of growth of total production
and of production per capita.
When the crude death rate declines, one of the terms on the right side
must change to keep the identity in balance. The first three terms on the
right side-birthrates, migration rates, and the economic growth rate-
primarily reflect behavioral adjustments to mortality change. The fourth
-the growth rate of output per capita-is basically a default option,
inevitably activated if none of the other three terms change. If none of
the four terms on the right can change, or change for very long, the de-
cline in CDR cannot be sustained. This is the basic Malthusian model,
in which the "passion between the sexes" placed a floor on the crude
birthrate, a subsistence level of production bounded R pc from below,
migration was defined as impossible, and slow technical change and
rapidly diminishing returns to labor constrained R p from above.
As an identity, any term in it could be isolated on one side of the
equation and the others forced to "respond" to its changes. The justifi-
cation for isolating the CDR is provided in the first part of the paper:
a substantial fraction of changes in CDR have been induced by factors
independent of any term on the right side, and it is reasonable to view
them as being forced to respond to it. To the extent that declines in
CDR have been produced by increases in rates of growth of production
per head, the equation as presented is misleading.Ill
In most of the remainder of this section we will consider the various
ways populations appear to have responded to mortality declines, taking
each of the possibilities in turn. The review attempts to be positive and
historical rather than normative.
Declines in Crude Birthrates
There are a multitude of ways that changes in mortality can induce
changes in fertility. Three of the effects are quasi-biological. Declines in319 Mortality Declines in Less Developed Countries
mortality change the age structure in such a way as to reduce the pro-
portion of the population in the childbearing years and to reduce crude
birthrates if age-specific fertility rates remain constant. Using the earlier
example, gains in female life expectancy from 30 to 50 to 70 years, with
age-specific fertility held constant at a level that produces a gross repro-
duction rate of 2.5, changes the crude birthrate from 38.78/1,000 to
37.12 to 35.99. The decline in the crude death rate over this range is
from 33.34 to 5.78, so that the decline in the birthrate compensates for
10.I % of the decline in crude death rates through this age-structural
route (Coale and Demeny 1966).
A second biological mechanism operates through breast-feeding.
Breast-feeding inhibits ovulation, particularly in poorly nourished popu-
lations. Survival of the previous birth, by extending lactation, tends to
delay the arrival of the next birth. Estimates of the average amount of
net delay range as high as 12-13 months in Senegal, Bangladesh, and
certain preindustrial European populations, although an estimate of
about 7 months is probably more representative of poor agrarian popu-
lations (see the review in Preston 1975b). Since average interbirth
intervals in such populations average about 30-35 months, the compen-
sating variation in fertility to a change of infant mortality rates can be
as high as 35% but is more likely to be in the area of 20%. That is, if
all a woman's children die in infancy, her average interbirth intervals
will be shorter by 20% and she will have approximately 20% more
births over her reproductive life than if all had survived. In urban Latin
American settings, where breast-feeding is usually short if it occurs at
all, the compensating variation from this source is negligible (Rutstein
and Medica 1975).
A third quasi-biological influence operates in the opposite direction
but is probably fairly weak. Mortality declines make it more likely that
marriages will survive through the end of the partners' reproductive
periods. In areas such as India where sanctions against widow remar-
riage are strong, reductions in the incidence of widowhood probably
exert an upward pressure on fertility. Arriaga (1967) has argued that
this mechanism is responsible for substantial postwar increases in child-
woman ratios in certain Latin American populations. However, his argu-
ment neglects the age-structural changes that are directly produced by
mortality declines. The maximum effect of mortality changes on a wom-
an's completed fertility can be estimated by assuming that no remarriage
is possible and that childbearing occurs at a constant rate throughout
her reproductive life up to the death of her husband or for 25 years,
whichever comes first. Then her completed fertility is simply propor-
tional to the expected number of years lived by the husband in the first
25 years of marriage. Assuming that males are age 20 at marriage, this
expectation goes from 20.97 years in a population with a male life ex-
pectancy at birth of 30.08 to 24.49 when life expectancy is 68.56320 Samuel H. Preston
(Coale and Demeny 1966, pp. 7, 23). Fertility would increase by
16.8%, or by perhaps 6 points, while the death rate would decline by
perhaps 25 points. Complete prohibition of widow remarriage could
thus boost the growth acceleration induced by mortality decline by some
25 %, making it roughly equivalent to but opposite in sign from the
lactational effect. However, it does not appear that taboos on widow
remarriage are sufficiently widespread outside of India to have anywhere
near this effect.
In addition to the three quasi-biological links, there are many possible
behavioral ones. Since these are the subject of another conference paper
(chap. 3), they will not be reviewed here (see also O'Hara 1975).
Suffice it to say that the magnitude of one relationship has now been
investigated rather carefully in a variety of populations in Asia and Latin
America, as well as in preindustrial Europe. It has repeatedly been
shown that, among women of a particular parity, those who had experi-
enced one additional child death subsequently bore, on average, far
fewer than one additional birth. Furthermore, some of the additional
childbearing that did occur could be traced indirectly to the biological
link identified above. The studies have attempted to control other
characteristics of women believed to influence fertility (see studies by
Chowdhury, Khan, and Chen; Heer and Wu; Rutstein and Medica; and
Knodel in Committee for ... Demography 1975). The largest "replace-
ment" effect was 0.28 identified in Taiwan by Heer and Wu. It may be
that the dead children were replaced in advance, but the simple demog-
raphy of death makes this an inefficient reproductive strategy. The large
majority of children who die before adulthood do so in the first two or
three years of life, and their death can be observed and reacted to by
parents during their own reproductive period.
The apparent failure of parents in many LDCs to behave as though
they were pursuing a single reproductive target framed in terms of sur-
viving children should not be surprising. It is clear that many of the
social norms and sanctions that regulate reproductive behavior in LDCs
refer to age at entry into union, frequency of intercourse, postnatal
abstinence, number of partners, lactation, remarriage, and so on, rather
than specifically to the number of children born or surviving (Polgar
1972). It is not necessary to reject the view that reproducers are goal-
directed, but only to recognize that social norms and expectations have
established other goals than "the" number of children. These norms and
expectations are not responsive to an individual's experience with child
death, although they may be responsive to aggregate mortality rates.
Such conditioning is in fact the basis of functionalist theories of fertility.
Davis (1955) has repeatedly argued that high-mortality populations
must adopt a set of institutions and customs producing high fertility or
else face extinction. The major adaptive institution he points to is the321 Mortality Declines in Less Developed Countries
extended family, which encourages early entry into union by arranging
marriages and stimulates fertility by removing many of the child-rearing
costs from the parents. The expected positive effect of family extension
on fertility has not been observed in most empirical studies at the house-
hold level (see the review in Burch and Gendell 1970). More to the
point, it is not clear how the group-selection processes that are supposed
to have created such institutions in the first place would operate to
change them when mortality conditions relax.
There is one aggregate-level linkage between death rates and birth-
rates that deserves mention because of its apparent importance in pre-
industrial Europe. In a spatially limited system where land is the basis
of wealth and accession to land the prerequisite for marriage, the rate of
marriage and hence childbearing will depend upon the rate at which
land becomes available, hence on mortality. Exogenous declines in mor-
tality will, more or less automatically, reduce fertility by slowing the
turnover of land and delaying marriage. Such a system was apparently
an important feature of demographic-economic relations in Western
Europe from 1600 to 1800 and may account for the generally late age
at marriage in these populations (Habakkuk 1971; Wrigley 1969; see
Eversley 1957 for a vivid numerical description of the expected re-
sponses to an epidemic). More important, economic historians have
suggested that this mechanism, the "European marriage pattern," was a
fundamental basis of the industrial revolution since it facilitated capital
accumulation by severing the link between the level of mortality and the
rate of growth of income per capita (Wrigley 1969; Habakkuk 1971).
How important this mechanism is in contemporary less developed coun-
tries is unclear. Increased rates of population growth have been accom-
panied by declining proportions married throughout much of Asia since
1960 or so (Smith 1976). However, many other modernizing influences
have also been at work. In Asia, at least, the prevalence of an extended
family system in rural areas reduces the dependence of marriage on
individual acquisition of land and presumably attenuates the link be-
tween population pressure and individuals' marital behavior. In urban
areas, however, a "suitable" job may come to play an analogous, though
no doubt less decisive, role.
That the sum of responses of fertility to mortality declines in LDCs
has been quantitatively weak is shown clearly in the history of popula-
tion growth rates. Durand (1967, p. 7) puts the annual rate of popu-
lation growth for LDCs at 0.3% for 1850-1900 and 2.1 % for 1950-65.
He further suggests that, with few exceptions, birthrates have not de-
clined. The United Nations Population Division "estimates and conjec-
tures" thatCDRs in LDCs were 38/1,000 in 1850-1900 and 17/1,000
in 1960-70, whereas CBRs were 40/1,000 and 41/1,000 in the two
periods (United Nations 1971, p. 7). These figures suggest no compen-322 Samuel H. Preston
sating variation in fertility whatever, although mortality declines may
have reduced the increase in fertility that would otherwise have occurred.
It is true that several of the postulated relations should operate with a
lag, and widespread (but small) declines in fertility since 1970 in LDCs
might be partially attributed to prior mortality decline. But the evidence
is that changes in birthrates have not been a major mechanism of adjust-
ment to date.
Declines in Crude Rates of Net Migration
An increase in out-migration for the world as a whole is clearly im-
possible, and it has been scarcely more of an option for LDCs as a bloc.
Perceived cultural, economic, and political difficulties attendant upon
migration from LDCs to MDCs have resulted in MDC immigration
quotas that are fixed at a point where they represent a tiny fraction of
annual natural increase in LDCs. International migration among LDCs
faces similar obstacles (see the discussion in Myrdal 1968, pp. 1459-
62). In this matter the present LDC situation is again markedly at vari-
ance with that of European populations in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries, when a substantial amount of population increase was drained
off via overseas or transcontinental migration. Friedlander (1969)
stresses the importance of this "safety valve" for delaying fertility re-
ductions in England and Sweden. My calculations indicate that 15-25%
of persons born in Sweden in the middle decades of the nineteenth cen-
tury died outside its borders.
When subnational territories are considered, the migration response
probably becomes more consequential, because the export of population
growth from one area to another faces fewer legal, cultural, and institu-
tional impediments. In Indonesia, the Philippines, and Ceylon, govern-
ment programs have attempted to redistribute population from dense,
rapidly growing areas to sparsely populated ones, although relative to
natural increase the movements have been small (Myrdal 1968, pp.
2139-49). How important mortality declines in rural areas have been
for rural-urban migration in LDCs has simply not been identified, to my
knowledge. The region with apparently the sharpest mortality decline
since 1900, Latin America, has also had the most rapid rural to urban
migration (United Nations 1971). But both regional peculiarities may
have been caused by its more rapid economic growth. Unlike the Euro-
pean situation, net rural-urban migration is not required to maintain
constant proportions in the two sectors. Rural birthrates are higher, but
so in general are rural death rates. Rates of natural increase are not
widely disparate (Davis 1973). It has often been suggested that, in Asia
at least, a large fraction of rural natural increase (which accounts for
the large bulk of the annual volume) simply cannot be exported to urban
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predictions prove pessimistic, it remains that, for national aggregates,
changes in net migration rates have not been and will not be an impor-
tant response to mortality decline.
Increases in Growth Rates of Total Production
The effect of population growth on economic growth is obviously a
topic whose scope and complexity are too vast to be adequately reviewed
here. While the effects of changes in death rates on output are difficult
to partial out (see Denison 1962 for one attempt), economic history
and economic theory are quite consistent with the view that Rp has been
the principal respondent to changes in CDR.
A decline in CDR generally increases the growth rate of the labor
force in roughly equal measure. As noted above, the labor force growth
rate is typically incremented in the short run by a slightly smaller
amount than the population growth rate. But even after accounting for
this tendency, if we accept standard estimates of the elasticity of pro-
duction with respect to changes in the quantity of labor input on the
order of 0.5 to 0.8, more than half of the "response" can be accounted
for without any change in other inputs or in technology.
There are reasons to believe that other inputs have typically changed
in a reinforcing fashion. In some instances (South America, Southern
Africa, and much of Asia) the growing population has had access to
unutilized land not markedly inferior to that already under production
(MyrdaI1968). According to D. Gale Johnson (1974, p. 89), between
1935-39 and 1960 approximately 75% of the increased grain output in
developing countries resulted from expansion of the planted area. In
some cases the mortality reduction campaigns themselves have liberated
large areas of previously inhospitable territory. Taylor and Hall (1967)
cite examples of such effects from antimalarial programs in Nepal, Sri
Lanka, Sardinia, and Mexico (see also Sorkin 1975). Schultz (1964,
pp. 63-70) shows that the response is also present when mortality
changes in the opposite direction. An estimated 8% fall in the Indian
labor force resulting from the 1918-19 influenza epidemic was accom-
panied by a reduction of 3.8% in acreage sown.
Expansion of land use obviously cannot continue indefinitely, and to
the (apparently minor) degree that fixed factors are important in pro-
duction, the particular effect of accelerated population growth on per
capita production will be negative. For most purposes it is more impor-
tant to know the effects of mortality decline on the capital supply. With
one possibly important exception, the effects should not be radically
different from those of increased fertility. The age distributional effects
are similar in nature, though muted in the case of mortality change.
When mortality declines, the proportion of 'the population in a stage of
dissaving increases-permanently. Households face an increased depen-324 Samuel H. Preston
dency burden and governments a greater press of immediate consump-
tion demands. Business optimism regarding future demand for their
products rises with the growth rate of potential consumers. Business
profits and internally financed investments may increase as the labor
supply curve shifts outward, unless the shift also reduces consumers'
purchasing power. These effects have been reviewed elsewhere in con-
junction with fertility effects, and it is not profitable to reconsider them
here.
The one possibly important difference is that members of a lower-
mortality population can look forward to longer lives in which to reap
the benefits of personal investment. There is no such effect when fertility
is the source of growth acceleration. The present value of investments
with a long gestation period, such as extended schooling, retirement
equities, or children, necessarily rises when mortality rates fall. Mushkin
(1964), Schultz (1975), and others have suggested that such effects
may represent an important economic benefit of reduced mortality.
It seems indisputable that such effects operate, and are probably rein-
forced by the increased proportion of the population who are in the
investment stage. Nevertheless, it appears that the effects are relatively
small and can be easily overwhelmed by minor variations in discount
rates. To illustrate, define the present value of an investment in the
standard manner prior to a change in mortality:
PY. = ~ pea) [B(a) ;a C(a)] da,
where pea) = the probability that the investor will survive a years
from the time of investment according to the mortality
schedule in effect prior to the mortality decline
B(a), C(a) = benefits and costs of the investment realized or in-
curred in year a
r = subjective rate of discount, continuously applied.
Now superimpose a neutral mortality decline of 0.01 per year, equiva-
lent to a reduction in the CDR of 10/1,000, that is, a large decline. This
is the average reduction in age-specific death rates between ages 15 and
50 when male life expectancy at birth increases from 30.1 to 51.8 years
(Coale and Demeny 1966, pp. 7, 16). The new present value is
PY.' = ~ pea) e· OIa [B(a) -;..c(a)] da
~ [B(a) - c(a)]
= l pea) e(r-.UIJa da.
That is, such a major change in mortality conditions has the same effect
on present value as reducing the discount rate by only 0.01 and retain-325 Mortality Declines in Less Developed Countries
ing the initial mortality conditions. In view of the wide vanatIOn that
seems to prevail in discount rates, as partially reflected in the common
analytic practice of applying several that differ by 0.05 or even more,
it is readily seen that mortality prospects are a relatively minor influence
on present value.
As a more concrete illustration, we will compute the internal rate of
return on investment in schooling and show how it is affected by empiri-
cally observed variation in mortality. We have chosen Mexico for the
illustration because Carnoy (1967) provides all of the necessary infor-
mation except life tables.2f1 We will compute the internal rate of return
for a 15-year-old male who has completed grade 8 from his subsequent
completion of grades 9,10, and 11. Three mortality schedules are used:
the male life table of Mexico, 1921, having a life expectancy at birth of
33.66 years (Arriaga 1968); the male life table of Mexico, 1966, having
a life expectancy at birth of 59.49 years (Keyfitz and Flieger 1971);
and immortality. Results are shown in table 5.6.
It is clear from this table that the increment to the private or social
rate of return that results from replacing an eOo of 33.7 by immortality
is only 1.5 points. This is approximately the difference it makes to use
continuous rather than once-a-year compoundings. The reason for the
weak effect is simply that mortality rates in young and middle adulthood
are not high enough even in very high mortality populations to substan-
tially alter expected payoffs. The large variability in rates experienced
in childhood do not figure in the calculation, and the large variability at
older ages is heavily discounted.
The effect of mortality variation would be somewhat stronger if indi-
viduals were predominantly risk-aversive and made decisions on the
basis of the entire distribution of expected outcomes rather than simply
on the basis of the mean. Higher mortality adds greater variability to
the distribution of expected outcomes as well as reducing the mean. It
increases the chance that zero or negative returns will accrue to invest-
ment, and this increase is faster than is the reduction in mean. Never-
theless, for the bulk of investors-those in early and middle adulthood
Table 5.6 Internal Rate of Return from Completing Grades 9, 10, and 11
in Mexico, 1963, under Varying Assumptions about Mortality
Assumption
Mexican life table of 1921
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-it does not appear that even very radical mortality change could exert
much influence on perceived investment profitability.
On balance, it does not appear that the effects of population growth
acceleration on capital formation when mortality is the source should
be markedly different in nature from the effects when fertility is the
source. The Coale-Hoover model postulates a less-than-proportionate
increase in capital supply when the population grows faster via higher
fertility, and this feature is retained when the effects of mortality change
are simulated (Barlow 1967, 1968). Largely for this reason, Barlow
concludes that the antimalarial campaign in Ceylon ultimately had nega-
tive effects on per capita income growth, even after the improved health
of the labor force is accounted for. Confidence in this conclusion de-
pends on one's confidence in the savings-investment assumptions of the
Coale-Hoover model.
It is also possible that mortality reductions foster economies of scale
in production and an intensification of individual work effort. Again,
the subject is very complex, and in most respects the analysis of mortal-
ity variation need not differ from that of fertility variation. A postulated
difference is that mortality control programs have an important demon-
stration effect (Mushkin 1964; Fein 1964; Malenbaum 1970; and oth-
ers). That is, they demonstrate that individuals can control their own
destiny through the rational application of science and technology. They
attest to the power of man in contrast to that of the supernatural and
hence spark work effort and a stronger motivation toward self-fulfill-
ment. Malenbaum (1970) argues that this is the basis of observed asso-
ciations between mortality rates and labor productivity, but there are
surely other mechanisms that offer more plausible interpretations. The
contention has not been put to a rigorous test. It seems inconsistent with
observations that poor illiterate farmers in LDCs have always responded
quickly to new and profitable opportunities and technologies (Johnson
1974). A sense of personal control over the environment is one of the
strongest components of "modern" attitudes (Sack 1974, p. 90). But
the importance of mortality declines in the development of this attitude
and the influence of the attitude on output remain to be demonstrated,
important as the issue may be.
Changes in Growth Rates of Production per Capita
With constant technology and no changes in nonlabor factors of pro-
duction, it is reasonable to expect that a CDR decline of 10/1,000 would
raise the growth rate of total production only by 0.6-0.7% or so. If no
birthrate or migration adjustments were forthcoming, the rate of growth
of per capita income would decline by 0.3-0.4%. This is not a large
amount relative to prevailing growth rates, and it is not surprising that327 Mortality Declines in Less Developed Countries
the mortality declines have left no unmistakable imprint on per capita
national economic growth rates.
Nevertheless, there are circumstances where the mortality decline has
apparently had a decisive negative effect on economic well-being. Per-
haps the most vivid account is offered by William Allan (1965, especially
chap. 21). Allan outlines a cycle of land degeneration in East Africa
that was, he argues, initiated by a mortality reduction. Population pres-
sure at the kin-group level led to land subdivision and fragmentation,
since landowners were expected to share their holdings with needy kin.
Subdivision led in turn to a shortening of the fallow period and to soil
depletion and erosion. Declining yields led to accelerated shortening of
the fallow and to ultimate soil exhaustion. "Perhaps the greatest 'sin' of
the suzerain powers was the saving of life, the lives of millions of men
who under the old conditions would have died in early childhood, or in
later life, of famine, disease, and violence" (Allan 1965, p. 338). Ulti-
mately the response was out-migration, but not before a stage of eco-
nomic misery was encountered. The initial stages of intensified land use
are those described by Boserup (1965), but the outcome is very differ-
ent. Instead of self-sustaining growth supported by a newly developed
work ethic, the result was simply impoverishment. Obviously, some soils
can support extreme intensification and multiple cropping and others
cannot. Population pressure by itself is clearly not sufficient for sustained
technological change, nor does it appear to be necessary once the possi-
bilities of trade are opened up.
It is clear that general statements cannot be made about how popula-
tions have reacted or will react to exogenous mortality declines. The
reaction will depend on a wide variety of initial conditions. In agrarian
populations it appears that the most important conditioning factors are
type of soil, land tenancy and kinship-marriage systems, density, possi-
bilities for out-migration, savings and investment relationships, and the
saliency of surviving-children goals. A great deal of work in recent
economic and demographic history remains to be done before the quan-
titative details of the outline sketched in these sections can be confi-
dently filled in.328 SamuelH. Preston
Appendix
Table 5.A.l Estimates of National Indexes about 1940
Daily Calories Source:
Life per Capita (6)
Expectancy Year of Available at Year of Unless
Country at Birth Estimate Source Retail Level Estimate Noted
Australia 66.09 (40) (2) 3,128 (40)
Belgium 59.08 (38-40) (3) 2,885 (40)
Canada 64.62 (40-42) (I) 3,109 (40)
Czechoslovakia 56.79 (37) (I) 2,761 (40)
Chile 38.10 (40) (4) 2,481 (40)
Colombia 36.04 (38) (4) 1,860 (38) (7)
Denmark 66.31 (40) (2) 3,249 (40)
Egypt 38.60 (36-38) (1) 2,199 (40)
Finland 57.39" (40) (1) 2,950 (40)
Greece 54.37 (40) (I) 2,523 (40)
Guatemala 30.40 (40) (4)
Honduras 37.50 (40) (4) 2,079 (40)
Hungary 56.57 (41 ) (1) 2,815 (40)
India 32.27 (41 ) (5) 2,021 (40)
Ireland 60.02 (40) (1) 3,184 (40)
Japan 49.12 (39-41) (3 ) 2,268 (40)
Korea 48.90 (38) (I) 1,904 (40)
Luxembourg 60.07 (38-42) (3) 2,820 (34-38) (8)
Mexico 38.80 (40) (4) 1,909 (40)
Netherlands 65.43 (40) (2) 2,958 (40)
New Zealand 67.00 (36) (2) 3,281 (40)
Nicaragua 34.50 (40) (4)
Panama 42.40 (40) (4)
Peru 36.50 (40) (4) 2,090 (40)
Philippines 46.26 (38) (I) 2,021 (40)
Portugal· 51.06 (40) (2) 2,461 (40)
Puerto Rico 46.09 (39-41 ) (I) 2,219 (40)
Spain 50.18 (40) (I) 2,788 (40)
Sweden 66.64 (40) (I) 3,052 (40)
Switzerland 64.88 (40) (2) 3,049 (40)
Taiwan 47.80 (41 ) (1 ) 2,153 (40)
Thailand 40.02 (37-38) (I) 2,173 (40)
Turkey 33.91 (35-45) (15) 2,619 (40)
United Kingdom 61.64 (40) (2) 3,005 (40)
United States 63.74 (39-41 ) (I) 3,249 (40)




Capita Source: Source: Population
in 1970 (9) Un- (10) Un- in
U.S. Year of less Percentage Age Year of less Thousands
Dollars Estimate Noted Illiterate Range Estimate Noted (1940)(13)
1,128 (38-40) 2.5 (40) (14) 7,039
715 (38-39) 4.5 (40) (14) 8,301
1,041 (38-40) 3.16 10+ (40) 11,682
438 (38) 3.6 (37) (14) 14,429
371 (38-40) 28.2 10+ (40) 5,063
190 (38-40) 44.10 10+ (38) 8,702
971 (38-40) 1.5 (40) (14) 3,832
167 (39) 84.9 10+ (37) 16,008
419 (39) 8.8 (40) (14) 3,698
187 (38) 34.4 (40) (14) 7,319
78 (40) 65.4 7+ (40) 2,201
109 (41-42) 66.35 10+ (45) 1,146
318 (38-40) 6.0 10+ (41) 9,344
67 (38-39) 86.5 10+ (41) (10,1I)b 316,004
665 (40) 1.5 (40) (14) 2,993
260 (39) 71,400
68.6 10+ (30) 21,817
795 (39) 4.4 (40) (14) 292
138 (40) 51.5 10+ (40) 19,815
889 (38) 1.5 (40) (14) 8,879
1,055 (38-40) 1.5 (40) (14) 1,573
105 (40) 63.0 7+ (40) (12) 825
374 (40) 35.25 10+ (40) 620
89 (40) (16) 56.35 10+ (40) 7,033
113 (38) 37.75 10+ (48) 15,814
48.7 10+ (40) 7,696
413 (38-40) 31.5 10+ (40) 1,880
361 (40) (16) 23.2 10+ (40) 25,757
1,091 (40) 0.1 10+ (30) 6,356
1,246 (40) 1.5 (40) (14) 4,234
78.7 5+ (40) 6,163
128 (39) (11 ) 46.25 10+ (47) 14,755
212 (39) 79.1 10+ (35) 17,620
1,334 (38-40) 1.5 (40) (14) 41,862
1,549 (40) 4.2 10+ (40) (13) 132,594
291 (40) 56.50 10+ (41 ) 3,803330 Samuel H. Preston
Table S.A.l (continued)
Sources: 1. United Nations, Statistical Yearbook (1967).
2. Preston, Key/itz, and Schoen (1972).
3. Key/itz and Fleiger (1968).
4. Arriaga (1968).
5. Estimated by Davis (1951, pp. 62-63).
6. Estimates prepared by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the
United Nations, cited in "Food, Income, and Mortality," Population
Index 13, no. 2 (April 1947): 96-103.
7. United Nations, Statistical Yearbook (1951).
8. United Nations, Food and Agriculture Organization, Production
Yearbook (1958).
9. Estimates prepared by the Technical Group, U.S. Bureau of the
Budget; cited in "Food, Income, and Mortality," Population Index
13, no. 2 (April 1947): 96-103. All figures have been converted to
1970 U.S. dollars by application of the consumer price index from
U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States,
various issues.
10. United Nations, Statistical Yearbook (1949-50).
11. United Nations, Statistical Yearbook (1955).
12. United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization,
Basic facts and figures: Illiteracy, libraries, museums, books, news-
papers, newsprint, film and radios (Paris, 1952).
13. United Nations, Demographic Yearbook (1960).
14. Banks (1971).
15. Calculated by author from estimates of e~ presented in Shorter
(1968). The Coale-Demeny "South" model mortality pattern was
assumed to apply.
16. United Nations, National Income Statistics of Various Countries,
1938-1948 (Lake Success, N.Y., 1950).
8Average 1936-40 and 1941-50.






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Sources: (1) Shattuk (1951, p. 4; 1943 map prepared by U.S. Army Medical In-
telligence Branch); Faust (1941); Boyd (1949).
(2) United Nations, Statistical Yearbook (1958-74).
(3) World Health Organization, World Health Statistics Report (1973),
vol. 26, no. II.
(4) Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Develop-
ment Cooperation: Efforts and Policies of the Members of the De·
velopment'Assistance Committee, 1973 Review (Paris, 1973).339 Mortality Declines in Less Developed Countries
Notes
1. The zero-order correlation between eO0 and the natural log of national in-
come per capita for the 120 countries in appendix table 5.A.2 is 0.859; the correla-
tion between eOo and national income itself is only 0.693.
2. Causes eliminated include influenza/pneumonia/bronchitis, diarrheal disease,
and maternal mortality, and also a proportion of "other and unknown causes"
equal by age to the proportion of known causes assigned to infectious diseases at
that age.
3. The age distribution used for direct standardization is that of a female "West"
stable population with eOo =65 and r =.01 (Coale and Demeny 1966).
4. WHO in conjunction with the United Nations Population Division has esti-
mated that life expectancy for LDCs as a whole was 49.6 in 1965-70 (World
Health Organization 1974b, p. 23). Life expectancy in 1900 is the author's guess
based upon life tables calculated by Arriaga for Latin America and on life tables
for India, Taiwan, and Japan around the turn of the century. Corresponding
ASCDRs were computed by the author based on relationships between the two
mortality measures in the set of 165 populations employed by Preston and Nelson
(1974).
5. Pairwise deletion was employed for missing data in the 1940 regressions. That
is, results are based upon correlation matrices computed exclusively on the basis
of data that were available. N is taken as 28, the number of cases for which ob-
servations were complete. One observation was missing on literacy, three on na-
tional income, and four on calorie consumption. For no country was more than
one piece of information missing. The data on LDCs were considered too valuable
to sacrifice all information because one piece was missing. Standard errors are
shown in parentheses.
6. Several alternative specifications of these equations were employed, but results
were not appreciably altered. These included polynomial representations of income
and calories and measurement of CAL from different base points. The R2's for
equations including first- and second-degree terms for Y and CAL were lower than
those for the specification presented in the text despite the addition of two vari-
ables. The use of other base points for CAL left R2 unaffected to four decimals.
Population-weighted regressions were rejected on the grounds that they gave too
much weight to India, where measurement of variables was believed to be unusu-
ally poor, especially in 1940.
7. There are of course many ways to attribute differences to changes in values
of variables and to changes in coefficients, none of them clearly preferable. In this
instance we are constrained by the unavailability of data for most LDCs in 1940.
Substitution of 1970 values of the regressors into the 1970 equation will not, of
nO = virtually none; 1 = low; 2 = moderate; 3 = high.
hCurrent U.S. dollars per capita.
cIncludes net official flow of external resources to individual countries from de-
veloped market economies and multilateral agencies and bilateral commitments of
capital by centrally planned economies. "Military expenditures and contributions
are excluded as far as possible."
dInformation not available for 1966 through 1968.
"Information for 1970-72 from source 4.340 Samuel H. Preston
course, usually yield the correct 1970 life expectancy for a country. But the pre-
dictions must be very nearly correct in the aggregate, since the regression plane
must pass through the mean of the variables and since 94 of the 120 observations
are LDCs.
8. This figure is close to the 9.7 estimate derived by Preston (1975a, p. 238),
who considered only income and used cruder, regional income distributions of
1963 to evaluate changes between 1938 and 1963.
9. Once again, pairwise deletion is employed for cases of missing data.
10. The mean values of AID and WAT for the 17 LDCs were 4.77 and 2.21,
respectively.
11. 16.46 = 31.47 - .0211(2.59) - .4063(39.39) + .0750(4.77) + .2939(2.21).
Of the 16.46 year gain, 1.01 years is attributed to external aid.
12. A large majority of countries in the WHO survey listed lack of financing as
the principal barrier to expanded water supply and sewerage systems (World
Health Organization 1973).
13. For an account of the impact of the Catholic diocese of Oklahoma on mor-
tality in a Maya village, see Early 1970. The experience was probably repeated
hundreds of times.
14. For ample documentation, see World Bank (1975) and Bryant (1969).
15. Compiled from United Nations, Statistical Yearbook, 1974, table 197. Fig-
ures refer to thirty-nine LDCs.
16. WHO has compiled es!imates of private consumption expenditures on health
care in certain LDCs (World Health Organization 1970). The percentage of total
private consumption that is spent on health can be compared with the proportion
of GNP represented by government health expenditure, a procedure that reduces
incomparabilities resulting from differences in the years of estimate. The percent-
ages are the following (private consumption appearing first): Sierre Leone, 2.9 and
0.9; Jordan, 0.6 and 2.8; Thailand, 3.6 and 1.2; the Philippines, 1.7 and 0.5; Ma-
laysia, 2.4 and 2.5; Panama, 4.0 and 2.2; Jamaica, 1.1 and 2.7. Government health
expenditures are from World Bank (1975, annex 3).
17. WHO, for example, does not absorb any materials costs but views its role
exclusively as providing technical, advisory, and educational assistance (Goodman
1971, pp. 203-4). Dispute over the provisions of assistance for material led to the
"resignation" from WHO of Soviet-bloc countries between 1949 and 1955.
18. The class distribution of gains in mortality is not well documented. There
was a sharp contraction of age-standardized mortality ratios for various classes in
England during the twentieth century (Antonovsky 1967, p. 63). Even constant
ratios would entail reductions in absolute differences, which is the pertinent index
when population composition is considered.
19. This is a less serious problem than it might at first appear. The coefficients
of InY presented earlier range from 3.6 to 7.0 (the latter observed when no other
term except income distribution is present in the cross-sectional analysis). A
I-point increase in the rate of per capita economic growth would thus be associ-
ated with at most a gain in life expectancy of 0.07 years. A gain in eOo of 2 years
is roughly associated with a drop in CDR of 0.0015. Thus, a 0.01 gain in the rate
of economic growth would be expected to reduce the CDR by at most 0.07
(.001512) =0.000053, or by 0.53% of the change in Rpc'
20. Earnings differentials were obtained from a 1963 survey of 4,000 urban
wage earners. Adjusted earnings differentials presented in Carnoy's (1967) table 3
are employed. Retirement was assumed to occur at age 65. The continuously com-
pounded rate of return was calculated using the formula presented in the text, with341 Mortality Declines in Less Developed Countries
PY. set equal to zero. For calculation of social costs, the average annual public
expenditure per student by grade is added to direct personal outlays and income
forgone.
Comment J. D. Durand
I will attempt to fit some of Preston's findings with regard to the deter-
minants of mortality, and related results in Ronald Lee's paper (chap.
9), into a sketch of salient features of the evolution of determinants of
the overall levels and trends of mortality during recent centuries and
decades.
Results of recent work in this field at the University of Pennsylvania
suggest that the typical form of the trend of expectation of life in coun-
tries making the transition from premodern to modern regimes of mor-
tality may be represented by an essentially logistic curve, which can be
divided into fairly distinct phases as follows:
O-pretransitional phase, in which expectation of life fluctuates
around a nearly constant long-term level;
I-initial phase of transition, in which expectation of life increases
irregularly at a relatively slow long-term average rate;
2-"takeoff" phase, in which expectation of life rises at a steady,
rapid rate;
3-final phase, in which expectation of life rises slowly and appears
to be approaching a ceiling at a high level.
I will attempt to draw a tentative general sketch of principal causal
factors that have contributed to the increases in expectation of life (e)
during each of these phases of the transition, in terms of the following
simplified formula: e = f(y, k, S, n, ...) where y stands for income per
head, k for knowledge of the causes of disease and death and methods
of prevention and treatment (including what the layman knows as well
as what the physician knows), S for social action in the broad field of
health protection, and n for natural factors.
This is not a comprehensive formulation of the determinants of mor-
tality. Preston shows that the distribution of income and nutrition are
influential; among other factors that may have played significant roles
in the gains of life expectancy during modern times are the advance of
popular education and the decline of fertility; no doubt urbanization has
influenced the trends in various countries, and other factors could be
J. D. Durand is professor of economics and sociology and a research associate
of the Population Studies Center, University of Pennsylvania.342 Samuel H. Preston
mentioned. However, probably the greater part of the increases in expec-
tation of life in most parts of the world during the last two centuries
can be attributed to the growth of y, the advances of k and s, and some
favorable changes in n. I do not presume that the effects of these factors
have been simply additive. It is not to belittle the value of Preston's
regression models to postulate, for example, that the effects of given
changes in each and all of the factors have varied with the levels of e,
as is shown vividly by the smallness of recent gains of life expectancy
in countries where the highest levels have been achieved.
Pretransitional Regimes
Lee's study of preindustrial England provides a most valuable exam-
ple of conditions and factors of mortality in a pretransitional state. In
this case, we may disregard factors k and s, assuming that they were
constant in effect, at least up to the eighteenth century. From the thir-
teenth to the eighteenth century, there were important variations of
mortality in England, both long-term and short-term, and Lee finds that
these were due mainly to noneconomic factors; that is, presumably
natural factors in the main. The identification of these natural factors
remains an unsolved puzzle. Lee says, "they may have been climatic, or
the by-product of independent epidemiological changes, or the result of
voyages of exploration."l As regards climate, Le Roy Ladurie's work
is rather discouraging to hopes of finding in its variations a satisfactory
explanation for the long swings in mortality, but the question of its in-
fluence on the hazards of disease as well as on agriculture has by no
means yet been disposed of. There were also important long- and short-
term ups and downs of y, represented in Lee's analysis by indicators of
wages and prices, and he finds that their influence on mortality was not
negligible, although it was less potent than the influence of n. One of the
most interesting features is the low ceiling over e. Apparently even
the wealth of kings and dukes would not purchase more than about 25
to 35 years of life expectancy, depending on the conditions of n. The
ceiling is much higher today, but it is still firm. Unlimited growth of
national income per head seems unlikely under present conditions to
bring expectation of life for the two sexes much above 75 years.
England's economic situation during the centuries shortly before the
industrial revolution was relatively favorable compared with that of most
other countries, as Lee points out. Both e and y were probably consid-
erably lower in most of the rest of the world, and it is likely that the
influence of changes of y over time may have been stronger elsewhere
than it was in England. Lee suggests this with reference to Gaubert's
observations on mortality in Beauvais during the seventeenth and eigh-
teenth centuries. However, I would hypothesize that n was a major343 Mortality Declines in Less Developed Countries
factor in both temporal variations and international differences in mor-
tality under the pretransitional regimes throughout the world.
Preston (1975) gives a chart of the changing relation between e and
y in international cross sections about 1900, 1930, and 1960. If data
were available to draw such a chart with reference to conditions around
1750 and earlier dates, I presume that the correlation between e and y
would be seen to have been weaker, the curve representing the relation
between the two variables would exhibit a less steep positive slope, and
it would shift erratically up and down from one date to another under
the influence of changing natural factors. A major feature of the transi-
tion to modern regimes of mortality has been progressive neutralization
of the influences of n as a result of the growth of y and advances of k
and s.
First Phase of the Transition
Although it is not easy to define the date of beginning of the mortality
transition in any country, the secular trend of slowly rising expectation
of life identified with the first phase of the transition was clearly general
in Western Europe during the nineteenth century, and indications of
accelerating rates of population growth suggest that it was also wide-
spread in Eastern Europe, North Africa, and Latin America. The trend
of mortality in the United States before the closing decades of the nine-
teenth century remains an unresolved question.
In the countries in the vanguard of industrial development during the
nineteenth century, the growth of income per head was undoubtedly a
major factor contributing to the decline of mortality in this first phase,
but the effect of increasing y was reinforced by advances in k and s.
Under the heading of k, in addition to the important innovation of
smallpox vaccination, I surmise that increasing understanding of the
importance of hygiene and proper feeding of children, linked with the
advance of popular education in the industrializing countries, played
an influential part. Under s were such social actions as protection of
water supplies, urban sewerage, swamp drainage, quarantine practices,
restriction of child labor, and regulation of conditions of women's em-
ployment. Such health-protective social actions were not confined to the
wealthiest countries; Sanchez-Albornoz (1974) traces their develop-
ment in Latin American cities during the nineteenth century.
With regard to the historical antecedents of Preston's (1975) chart
of changing relations between e and y during the twentieth century, I
postulate, although I cannot provide statistical proof, that the develop-
ments related to the first phase of the mortality transition during the
nineteenth century had the following effects: making the correlation
between e and y stronger than it had been under the pretransitional344 Samuel H. Preston
regimes; gradually shifting upward the curve of e values corresponding
to given levels of y; and making the slope of the curve steeper-that is,
widening the differences in e between richer and poorer nations.
Second Phase of the Transition
The decided quickening of the rate of gain in life expectancy that
marks the beginning of the second phase of the transition took place in
the 1890s or about a decade earlier or later in the more developed
countries of Europe and America. It seems clear that this turn of the
trend was primarily a result of the first revolution in death-control
technology produced by the validation and wide acceptance of the germ
theory of disease. The effect of this was not limited to the new tech-
niques of immunization and therapy for particular diseases that began
to be invented late in the nineteenth century. Meanwhile, increasing
income and health-protective social actions continued to contribute to
gains in e, and it seems a reasonable hypothesis that the tightening con-
trol of fertility may also have contributed to the quickening reduction
in child mortality.
The less developed countries in Latin America, Asia, and Africa were
slow to get much benefit from the advances in k at this stage. They were
handicapped in applying the new knowledge by low income, low levels
of popular education, small resources at the disposal of the governments,
and perhaps colonial administrations' lack of interest in taking very
costly actions to protect the health of the indigenous people. So the
beginnings of the second phase of the transition were delayed in most
of these countries until after World War I, and in many until the 1940s
or 1950s. As a result, the differences in life expectancy between more
and less developed countries widened during the early decades of the
present century, and the slope of the curve of e in relation to y grew
steeper as it shifted upward more rapidly in the higher than in the lower
brackets of per capita income.
It might be tempting to infer that countries had to reach some thresh-
old of income and development in other respects to be eligible for rapid
progress in the reduction of mortality under the conditions of this period.
But some observations imply that if this were true, the level of the
threshold was not high enough to explain fully why so many less devel-
oped countries were so long retarded in entering the second phase of
the mortality transition:
1. The case of the eastern and southern European countries: Al-
though they were considerably less developed than the northwestern
European countries, they were quick to join their richer neighbors in
the sharp acceleration of gains in e around the turn of the century or
shortly afterward. In spite of handicaps in income, education, and other345 Mortality Declines in Less Developed Countries
aspects of development, the countries in eastern and southern Europe
generally managed to keep pace with those of northwestern Europe in
rates of gain in life expectancy until about the 1940s, when they began
to overtake the lead of the latter.
2. The case of Cuba: In a new study of the trend of mortality in
Cuba since the late nineteenth century, Diaz Briquets (1977) shows that
a spectacular reduction of mortality was achieved there during the few
years of TJnited States military occupation following the Spanish-Ameri-
can War, by a campaign of sanitary reforms and mosquito control insti-
gated and aided by the army of occupation. He estimates that the crude
annual death rate in the city of Havana dropped from a prewar average
of 32 per 1,000 in 1891-95 to 20 in 1903-7, and a large decrease was
achieved in the rest of the country also, in the face of general poverty
and illiteracy.
3. The case of Taiwan under Japanese rule during early years of this
century is another precocious example of the effective transfer of k and
s from a more developed to a less developed country (Barclay 1954).
This is even more remarkable than the Cuban case, because when the
Japanese arrived Taiwan was a good deal less developed than Cuba,
and the Japanese themselves had not yet reached a very high level of
either e or y.
4. A decided upturn of the trend of e took place during the 1920s
in a number of less developed countries (Cuba, Japan, Taiwan, and
others). Diaz Briquets (1977) observes that this seems to have been
especially characteristic of countries where export industries were dom-
inant, and he suggests that an economic boom in such countries in the
1920s owing to expanding demand and rising prices for their exports
might account for their having entered the second phase of the mortality
transition earlier than other less developed countries did. The interest
of their more developed trading partners in making these countries
healthy places to do business with and in may also have been a factor.
The relevance of the trend of income to the life expectancy gains in
less developed countries is illustrated in reverse by the example of Cuba
in the 1930s and early 1940s, when the misfortunes of the international
market for sugar cast Cuba into economic doldrums. Diaz finds that the
decline of mortality in Cuba was checked and probably temporarily
reversed during this period, and that worsening nutrition and diminish-
ing public and private expenditures on health services were important
factors.
A second revolution in the technology of disease control began about
1935 and progressed rapidly during the 1940s and 1950s, with major
advances of k especially in the fields of immunization, chemotherapy,
and chemical control of disease vectors. This time, the less developed346 Samuel H. Preston
countries were the principal beneficiaries. Although measures of trends
in e since 1940 are lacking for many of these countries, especially among
those at the lowest levels of development, it is apparent that substantial
gains since that time have been practically universal in the less devel-
oped regions of the world. Preston's findings suggest that 50% to 80%
of the gains between 1940 and 1970 in less developed countries may be
attributable to k and s factors, but advances on these fronts have not
gone so far as to make economic factors irrelevant. Gains in e since the
1940s have been less spectacular in the least developed countries, par-
ticularly in Africa, than in those that were somewhat more developed,
and Preston finds a positive association between rates of increase in e
and y among less developed countries.
A tendency toward slackening rates of gain in e in less developed
countries is apparent in the 1960s and 1970s. While this might be due
partly to slowing economic growth, Preston links it with a diminishing
rate of "structural change," that is, slowdown of the advance of k and s.
He observes that only a few innovations of major importance to health
technology have been made during the last decade. The implication is
that upward shifting of e in relation to y may be drawing to an end and
that e gains in less developed countries henceforth may depend mainly
on their ability to move up on the scales of y and related social develop-
ments. This has been suggested in a number of recent studies. However,
there may still be a good deal of scope for raising e in less developed
countries where it remains relatively low, through the pursuit of s ac-
tions to take fuller advantage of existing k at their present levels of y.
To cite once again the example of Cuba: the series of Cuban life tables
compiled by Diaz Briquets (1977) shows expectation of life at birth for
the two sexes increasing from 58.8 years in 1953 to 72.1 in 1971 (70.6
for males, 73.9 for females). The 1971 figure compares favorably with
that of the United States, especially for males. Diaz presumes that most
of the gain in Cuba since 1953 has taken place since the establishment
of the socialist government, and he attributes the high rate of gain since
that time mainly to more equal distribution of income and government
policies aimed at equalizing access to health services for all categories
of the population.
Although the less developed countries were the main beneficiaries of
the new advances in k since the 1930s, the more developed countries
also benefited to an important extent. Examination of the trends in a
number of more developed countries shows that the 1940s were a bum-
per decade for gains in life expectancy. Preston's analysis indicates that
a major share of the gains in more developed as well as less developed
countries since 1930 has been due to the upward shifting of the curve of
e in relation to y and other indicators of development, which may be
attributed to the advances of k and s.347 Mortality Declines in Less Developed Countries
Third Phase of the Transition
In more developed countries, the rates of gain in e have slowed con-
spicuously since the 1950s, and in many of them hardly any gains have
been registered during the past ten years. The same tendency is notice-
able in recent statistics from some less developed countries that have
attained levels of e comparable to those of more developed countries.
This feature is commonly interpreted as meaning that the expectation
of life in countries where it is now highest is approaching a ceiling that
cannot be surpassed by increasing income or by other means unless a
new revolution in medical technology is achieved-a revolution that
would make possible important gains in control over the so-called de-
generative diseases. If this interpretation is correct and if the less devel-
oped countries where e is still well below such a ceiling manage to
continue progress in reducing their mortality rates through economic
development and fuller application of the present medical knowledge,
the time may come when levels of mortality will be nearly equalized
among countries around the world. The advances of k and s would then
have neutralized, to a large extent, the influence of y as well as that of n.
An interesting aspect of the recent trends in countries where e is high
is that they seem to be leveling off at considerably different values of e.
If they are coming up against a ceiling, the level of the ceiling seems not
to be the same in all countries. In the United States, for example, e
seems to be stagnating some four or five years below the level achieved
in the Scandinavian countries. On the surface, these differences do not
seem very consistently related to per capita income. I mentioned earlier
that Cuba's estimated expectation of life in 1971 compared favorably
with that of the United States. The position of Puerto Rico and Hong
Kong is similar, although they are far below the United States in per
capita income. Perhaps a part of the explanation for such anomalies
might be found in factors associated with advanced economic develop-
ment that are unfavorable to health and longevity. I think it would be
interesting to make a systematic study of factors related to the different
levels of e, and of mortality rates for sex and age groups, causes of
death, and so forth, at which the trends seem recently to have been
stalling in many countries. The distribution of income, governmental
action in fields of health care, environmental pollution, diets, and behav-
ioral patterns relevant to health are among the factors that might use-
fully be examined.
Note
1. McNeill (1976) argues that major factors in the long-range trends of mor-
tality and population growth in Europe between the fourteenth and eighteenth
centuries were new diseases resulting from increased contacts with the Orient
during the Mongol conquests and a subsequent gradual adaptation to these dis-
eases, as well as variations of climate.348 Samuel H. Preston
Comment Victor R. Fuchs
The paperby Preston has two principal purposes: to explain the increase
in life expectancy in the less developed countries over the past several
decades and to consider the effect of this increase on population size,
output, and output per capita. The bulk of the paper is concerned with
the first question, and I shall limit my comment to that. Furthermore, I
shall examine only one aspect of Preston's multifaceted discussion-the
attempt to partition the gain in life expectancy into the portion attrib-
utable to increased per capita income and the portion due to a structural
shift in the relationship between life expectancy and per capita income.
Using the data Preston provides, I have run regressions of life expec-
tancy (LE) on the natural logarithm of per capita income (LnY) for
four separate groups of countries: LDCs in 1940 (L40), MDCs in 1940
(M40), LDCs in 1970 (L70), and MDCs in 1970 (M70).1 The results
are presented in table C5.1. I have also plotted the predicted (from the
regressions) relationship between life expectancy and per capita income
for each group in figure C5.1. The curves are plotted over the range of
per capita income actually observed for each group.
Table CS.l Results of Regressing Life Expectancy on Logarithm of per
Capita Income across Less Developed and More Developed
Countries in 1940 and 1970
LE = a + b In Y L40 M40 L70 M70
b 4.99 6.65 7.82 .13
Ub (1.95) (1.21 ) (1.10) (.85)
a 13.3 17.1 12.5 70.8
Ua (10.0) (8.0) (6.7) (6.6)
R2 .27 .68 .77 -.08
N 16 15 16 15
Inspection of figure C5.1 suggests that the structural relation between
life expectancy and per capita income in the LDCs in 1940 was different
from that in the MDCs in the same year. Given the level of income, life
expectancy seems to have been appreciably higher in the MDCs. It is
therefore inappropriate to pool the two groups of countries, as Preston
does, without allowing for differences in structure. It should also be
Victor R. Fuchs is professor of economics at Stanford University and is a re-
search associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
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Fig. C5.1
Per capita Income (1970 dollars)
The relationship between life expectancy and per capita
income across less developed and more developed countries
in 1940 and 1970.
noted that in the MDCs in 1970, the relationship between life expec-
tancy and per capita income has disappeared, a phenomenon I have
called attention to before (Fuchs 1965, 1974). There can be no ques-
tion, therefore, of attempting to assess shifts in the function between the
MDCs in 1940 and 1970 or between the LDCs and MDCs in 1970.
I have run regressions that pool LDCs and MDCs in 1940 and LDCs
in 1940 and 1970 with dummy variables inserted to allow for differences
in intercepts and slopes. These results are reported in table C5.2.
The first regressions (part A) constrain the slopes of the pooled
groups to be equal but allow the intercepts to vary. We see that the shift
coefficients are large and highly significant in both cases. This means
that, compared with the LDCs in 1940, both the MDCs in 1940 and
the LDCs in 1970 had substantially higher life expectancy for any given
level of per capita income. The second set of regressions (part B) con-
strains the intercepts to be equal and allows the slopes to vary within
each pair of groups. We now find that the slopes do differ significantly.
The third set of regressions (part C) allows both the intercepts and the
slopes to vary, and with this specification none of the interactions are
statistically significant.
Ifone does not demand statistical significance, it is possible to answer
Preston's question fairly unambiguously along the following lines. The
mean life expectancy of the LDCs rose from 38.8 years in 1940 to 59.6350 Samuel H. Preston
Table C5.2 Pooled Regression Results with Interactions
L40 + M40
























































years in 1970, a rate of increase of 1.4% per annum (see table C5.3).2
Over that same period the mean per capita income (in 1970 dollars)
rose from $194 to $560. We can estimate what the change in life expec-
tancy would have been as a result of income change alone by moving
along either the 1940 predicted relation or the 1970 predicted relation.
The former tells us that life expectancy would have changed from 39.6
years to 44.8 years, an increase of 0.4% per annum. If we calculate the
change along the 1970 curve, we get a predicted increase of 0.5% per
annum, from 53.7 years to 62.0 years.
Alternatively, we can look at the implied rates of change attributable
to structural shift by comparing predicted life expectancies at the same
per capita income in the two years. At $194 the implied change is 1.0%
per annum; at $560 it is 1.1 % per annum. Thus, either approach indi-
cates that about one-third of the observed change in life expectancy in351 Mortality Declines in Less Developed Countries
Table C5.3 Life Expectancy in Less Developed Countries in 1940 and 1970:





Predicted 1940 (P40:40) (from L40 regression)
Predicted 1970 (P70:40) (from L40 regression)
Predicted 1940 (P40:70) (from L70 regression)



















the LDCs between 1940 and 1970 can be attributed to the growth of per
capita income, and about two-thirds to a shift in the life expectancy-
income relationship. Preston presents one estimate of 50% due to struc-
tural change and another of 80% due to that source. The results pre-
sented here are quite consistent with those estimates.
Notes
1. The LDCs are all in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, and all had life expec-
tancies below 50 years in 1940. The MDCs are all in Europe, North America, and
Australia, and all had life expectancies above 50 years in 1940.
2. The change is expressed in percentage per annum in order to minimize the
problem of interaction between shifts in the function and movements along the
function.352 Samuel H. Preston
Comment Richard W. Parks
Preston presents an interesting regression test of the relative importance
of private and national income in determining life expectancies. In light
of the Kuznets and Fishlow discussions of interaction between the in-
come distribution and the age distribution of the population, it may be
useful to point out a possible bias in the Preston regression in section
5.1.1.
The income distribution as commonly measured does not correct for
the age distribution of the population. Thus, in a hypothetical world
with no differences among individuals in their lifetime income streams,
we will observe considerable income inequality as conventionally mea-
sured if individuals follow the usual life-cycle pattern of earning and
saving followed by retirement. For the determination of the effect of
income on life expectancy, it appears that a permanent income rather
than a measured income concept makes more sense, but given the data
available to him, Preston relies on the distribution of measured income.
Preston's distribution measure, which I shall call D = ~ In(Sj.05),
takes values ranging from - OC! to 0 on a scale representing increasing
equality. Thus we can represent the partial relationship between life
expectancy e
O
o, and D as shown in figure C5.2.
We expect a positive association. Suppose we start at point A with
given (unequal) distribution and low life expectancy. If incomes were
to become more equal (in a life-cycle sense), we would expect to find
a new point at B showing greater equality and higher life expectancy.
However, even with the pattern of life-cycle income corresponding with
point B, there is likely to be an effect on the measured income distribu-
Fig. C5.2
Richard W. Parks is associated with the Department of Economics, University
of Washington.353 Mortality Declines in Less Developed Countries
tion arising from the altered life expectancy. An increase in the share
of population in nonproductive years, for example, older age groups,
will have the effect of increasing the observed inequality. The observa-
tion based on measured income will be at point C, giving an upward
bias to the slope coefficient. Since the crucial test of the relative impor-
tance of national and private incomes in the determination of life ex-
pectancy depends on the size of the slope coefficient, the upward bias
would tend to suggest the absence of an effect for national jncome even
when it was in fact important.
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